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An assessment of the influence of United States foreign policy impact on the decision of NATO 
members to formally accept policies which align with U.S. strategic goals.  The assessment looks at 
the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategic documents of each United States Presidential 
Administration following the end of the Cold War to determine changes to U.S. commitment to 
NATO and the resultant changes to Alliance force posture and defense spending agreements.  The 
paper also assesses the impacts of U.S. Administration changes in rhetoric, and of U.S. direct military 
action in specific NATO-led operations against the resultant decision of NATO members to accede to 
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To what degree was the U.S. successful in influencing its allies to meet U.S. foreign policy goals 
concerning defense spending?  In 2014 NATO formally adopted a 2% defense spending goal 
championed by the United States which would increase defense spending requirements among almost 
every member of the Alliance.   What means have the U.S. used to influence Alliance members to not 
only arrest a 30-year trend in declining defense spending, but to increase defense spending across the 
board?  I intend to investigate to what degree changes to U.S. foreign policy, administration rhetoric, 
and calculated commitment of military forces as a demonstration of administration resolve have 
influenced NATO members to invest in U.S. led initiatives designed to meet the strategic security 
goals of the United States.   I will do this by examining the evolution of U.S. policy aimed at 
encouraging and pressuring European NATO allies to increase their defence spending. 
 
Throughout the post-Cold War period, United States foreign policy has shifted dramatically resulting 
in significant changes to their demands and expectations to the Alliance.  The rising threats assessed 
by the United States required modernization and updates to U.S. force structure and deployability.  By 
default, this also placed new demands on Alliance force structure if NATO was to remain 
interoperable with U.S. forces.  Changes to force structure and modernization require not only verbal 
commitment, but tangible investment.  Defense spending within the Alliance slowly emerged as a 
measure of Alliance member resolve for the United States, and U.S. foreign policy had a direct 
influence on member investment in defense capabilities following the Cold War; both negative and 
positive.  
U.S. foreign policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union  enabled and even encouraged the 
negative trend among Alliance defense spending.  Then, following the September 11 terror attacks, the 
United States made a significant change to foreign policy that impacted U.S. force structure and 
modernization which resulted in fundamental gaps in military capabilities and interoperability between 
the U.S. and its NATO allies.  NATO was forced to follow suit as best it could to maintain their most 
valued ally.  By the mid 2000’s the United States was demanding alliance members modernize the 
force and divest themselves from their cumbersome Cold War era conventional assets.  In 2006 NATO 
members verbally agreed to a 2% GDP defense spending target at the summit in Riga.  When NATO 
members did not respond with appropriate defense investment, the United States leveraged the Libya 
campaign of 2011 as an opportunity to make a point.  The limited involvement of the United States 
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was not a change in commitment among European NATO to develop their own military capabilities, 
they may fall short in an engagement should the United States not be able to participate.  This event 
set the stage for events leading up to the 2014 Wales summit where NATO formally adopted the 2% 
GDP defense spending metric which would require all but 3 members to make significant changes to 
their national defense budgets.   
In this paper intend to determine the effect changes to U.S. foreign policy and administration rhetoric 
have had on NATO members as it relates to defense spending investment within the Alliance.  It is 
defense spending which enables the modernization demands and force structure changes necessary to 
meet United States foreign policy initiatives.  I will demonstrate U.S. foreign policy change during this 
period by analyzing the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) documentation of each administration.  These two documents guide and direct U.S. foreign 
policy as it relates to this discussion.  The identified changes in policy are what have driven the 
dialogue and demands of U.S. Administration officials concerning NATO member defense spending 
as an enabler to achieving U.S. strategic goals.   
The discussion will be limited to the post-Cold War period from 1991-2018.  The 2% GDP investment 
was first verbally agreed to in 2006, and did not become an formally agreed to metric until 2014; 
however, I will be assessing NATO ally defense spending as measured by percent GDP for all periods 
discussed in this paper in order to provide a consistent metric of measure concerning this analysis.   
I will start with a discussion of the U.S. perspective concerning the “burden” of the NATO Alliance 
and the defense spending debate.  Next I will develop an understanding of how the United States has 
viewed their relationship to NATO in terms of U.S. foreign policy goals.  Then I will assess the 
progression of U.S. foreign policy through each post-Cold War administration and the resultant 
changes to NATO force posture and defense spending.  Finally, I will tie the previous sections 
together by analyzing the resultant changes to defense spending investment by NATO members as 
they have related to each U.S. administration and NATO summit decision.  Resultant member 
compliance discussed in the final section on Defense Spending is intended to demonstrate the weight 
of the 2014 formal commitment to defense spending versus the previous verbal commitment made in 
2006.  
 
It should be made clear that I am not arguing for or against the merits of effectiveness or fairness 
within the broader burden-sharing debate.  The fact is, regardless of the many burden-sharing variables 
of input and output, public goods, economic scale, etc. which have been debated; NATO members 
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the metric or any aspect of the discussion which brought about its selection.  I am focusing on how the 
United States foreign policy decisions and use of direct military engagement in NATO actions has 
influenced the decision of NATO to formally implement 2% GDP as the member goal concerning 




My method is primarily an analysis of what I have assessed to be key events and administration 
changes in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy decisions and their resultant effect on the US-NATO 
discussion concerning defense spending.  I follow a rational decision model as my basis for this 
method.  The idea that a shock or key event triggers a rational response which in turn triggers changes 
to that system in a logical series of steps or events consistent with previously established patterns of 
behavior.  That is, there is not a radical response which breaks with traditionally established responses 
to similar situations (i.e. the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 resulted in the deaths of 2,400 service 
members1 and the United States entry into WWII; therefore it is rational to expect the U.S. to launch a 
large scale military response following the September 11 terror attacks which killed over 2,900 
civilians2 on American soil).   
Discussion of four key events during the post-Cold War period of time demonstrate how changes to 
U.S. foreign policy or U.S. involvement in military actions have shaped the decision of NATO 
members to arrest the 30-year decline in defense spending and formally adopt the U.S. championed 
2% GDP defense spending metric.  
4 Events:  
1. The U.S. foreign policy shift from a regional focus to global interdependence  
2. The Sept 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States  
3. U.S. involvement in the 2011 Libya campaign 
4. The 2014 Wales Summit  
 
1 (Kiger, 2018) 
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These four events reinforce how changes to U.S. foreign policy and calculated adjustments to direct 
involvement in NATO operations have manifested as changes to NATO member defense spending 
agreements and tangible results favorable to the United States.  The omission of certain NATO 
missions, summits, or events is not intended to imply they did not have impact or merit.  The limited 
scope of this work requires a focus on what I have determined to be the most influential key elements 
of United States policy decisions which ultimately drove the decision to adopt the 2% GDP metric by 
NATO.  Personal bias as a U.S. military member cannot be ignored in this assessment, and likely has 
an impact regardless of my intention to remain objective in my evaluation.   
I have assessed U.S. foreign policy as defined by the National Security Strategies (NSS) published by 
each administration.  I have chosen to focus on the impact of the Executive branch of U.S. government 
vice the Congress which represents the Legislative branch.  The reason for this is because it is the 
executive branch, not the legislative, which drives U.S. foreign policy and decision.  Even though 
Congress has many checks and balances over the Executive branch of the U.S. government, the 
Constitution of the United States gives the President the sole power to determine foreign policy.3  The 
NSS is the document used by the President to expresses their foreign policy to Congress, the 
Department of Defense, and the world.  Therefore, U.S. policy is inextricably tied to and defined by 
each administration regardless of which parties (Republican or Democrat) control the elements of the 
Legislative branch of U.S. government.  It is the policies of each administration which drive the 
foreign policy decisions of the Department of State, and the military decisions of the Department of 
Defense.   
In a rational system, key events shape policy decisions and key leaders shape alliance decisions.  
NATO’s overt reliance on United States military assets and capabilities regarding the maintenance of a 
credible defense and deterrence posture places NATO in a position where it must acquiesce to U.S. 
foreign policy demands or suffer potential degradation to the potency of the Alliance.  In a rational 
system this places the United States in a position of significant influence.  
This approach is narrowly focused and does not account for other factors which may impact Alliance 
member decisions.  Geographic location, individual member assessment of threat, economies of scale, 
status of the global economy, bureaucratic resistance, and domestic constraints or restraints certainly 
have an impact on individual member decisions.  I have also limited myself from assessing the 
conflicting points of view which abound in American politics.  This is intentional.  It is the Executive 
Branch, not the Legislative Branch, which set foreign policy and drive military engagement and 
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direction within the U.S. system.  The internal debate concerning U.S. foreign policy discussions or 
relationships with NATO from a congressional perspective is a thesis in itself and would detract from 
this assessment.   
My investigation into the degree of success concerning U.S. foreign policy influence concerning 
NATO member defense spending will manifest itself in a determination of High, Moderate, or Low 
Impact.  High Impact is defined as U.S. foreign policy is seen as the driving primary force behind the 
NATO decision to formally adopt a defense spending goal.  Moderate Impact is defined as U.S. 
foreign policy is seen as having a strong influence among other contributing factors.  Low impact is 
defined as U.S. foreign policy is seen as an ancillary consideration to the NATO decision to formally 
adopt a defense spending goal.   
The key events listed above have impacted the leaders of the United States resulting in rational 
changes to each administration’s focus concerning the NSS foreign policy directives.  The NSS 
reflects U.S. grand strategy of each administration, and ultimately shapes U.S. defense posture.  
Changes to defense posture or force structure resultant of a shift in focus or design within the NSS 
create demands from the U.S. to their military alliance members.  The NSS is an unclassified 
document which is published and available, as are the U.S. military’s defense strategic documents 
published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining U.S. defense posture designed to meet the means 
required to attain NSS defined goals.  It is for this reason I have selected these documents as my 
primary sources.  These documents clearly articulate U.S. intentions to our allies and enemies alike, 
and they shape the internal development of U.S. means to meet strategic ends.   
3 United States Historical Perspective of the 
NATO Burden  
 
Burden sharing is a complex debate among NATO members, and has been approached from many 
angles.  This is not a paper on burden sharing.  However, in order to discuss the U.S. influence on 
NATO member 2% defense spending investment the burden discussion must be addressed.  In this 
section I am focusing on the view of NATO from the U.S. perspective both during and after the Cold 
War.  This baseline understanding concerning the U.S. perspective is informative to the National 
Security Strategy and direct U.S. military involvement in NATO initiatives to be discussed in 
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The debate of how to define and assess burden among NATO members is as old as the Alliance itself.  
The United States has made accusations of carrying the European continent on its back since the 
formation of the Alliance in 1949.  A common thread of discord within the U.S. perspective revolves 
around disproportionate defense investment resulting in divergent capability sets and a lack of 
Alliance interoperability due to modernization deficiencies among NATO allies.   
 
At its outset after WWII the United States had not intended NATO to be the enduring platform for 
peace that it has evolved to become today.  The United States viewed the duration of NATO as tied 
loosely to that of the Marshall Plan.  It was a strategic puzzle piece in an effort to provide security and 
stability in a time of reconstruction on the European continent after WWII.  According to Eugene 
Carrol, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, NATO was designed by its founding 
members with a well-defined strategic objective: 
 
“to provide a shield for Western Europe and the democratic nations to rebuild 
their social, political and economic structures free of fear from foreign 
aggression, but only until such a time that they could take over the responsibility 
themselves.”4 
 
The United States whole-heartedly shared in this viewpoint.  Supreme Allied Commander (and future 
U.S. President) General Dwight D. Eisenhower is said to have believed that if the U.S. was still in 
Europe 10 years after the creation of NATO, it would signal the failure of the Alliance to achieve its 
intended purpose (Cooper, 1992, p. 714).  He believed that once Europe had their ‘feet under them’ 
again, the European countries would be able to provide for their own security.  His viewpoint changed 
in September 1949 when the Soviet Union flexed its nuclear muscle with the first public detonation of 
a Soviet nuclear weapon.  From that point forward the strategic focus of NATO rapidly shifted from 
reconstruction and security to communist containment.   
 
The Soviet Union and the rise of communist influence provided a new raison d’etre for NATO.  A new 
vision, and a collective focus to the Alliance.  Where NATO’s original strategic objective was to 
provide a general security (a shield) for Western Europe there was now a credibly identified solitary 
threat of focus for the Alliance,  Whatever the U.S. original intentions were concerning their longevity 
in the Alliance, the specter of the spread of communism backed by a credible nuclear power could not 
go unchecked.  Keeping the wolf at bay during the Cold War era was defined by development and 
maintenance of credible collective deterrence.  The economic burden associated with this task was a 
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minimally contentious issue within the Alliance so long as the Soviets presented a credible threat to 
the western powers.  Resultant of this common assessment of the threat to European stability and 
prosperity, the priorities of the individual Alliance members reflected a more balanced approach to 
defense investment during this period.   
 
Historical data from this period shows all members of the Alliance maintained defense spending 
initiatives which remained well above a 2% GDP threshold during the Cold War.5  The NATO average 
investment in defense spending during the last 30 years of the Cold War was 3.42% GDP.6  During the 
Cold War the containment strategy dictated an Alliance doctrine focused on an established 
conventional military force and nuclear deterrence capability.  This provided concrete guidance on 
what was required in terms of force and command structure.  Once the raison d’etre was removed with 
the fall of the Soviet Union on 25 December 1991 that the strategy of containment died.   
 
With eastern Europe clamoring for independence as the yoke of communism lifted, it was an 
opportune time to re-focus NATO efforts and embrace the opportunity to spread democratic ideals and 
prosperity.  The allied focus of defense and deterrence shifted to exporting stability (Ringsmose, 2010) 
in support of UN humanitarian operations, development assistance and security contributions to other 
international organizations (Sandler & Shimizu, 2014).  This new focus fit well with the U.S. foreign 
policy initiatives of the time.  New missions from the low end of the combat spectrum took the place 
of the high-end focus of Cold War doctrines.  Missions such as humanitarian aid and peacekeeping 
served to support U.S. foreign policy initiatives of the early 1990s at minimal risk to U.S. forces.  
However, this period issued in an age of apathy concerning military investment among many European 
members7, and resulted in the degradation of NATO’s high-end military capacity.  A fact that would 
rear its head starting in the late 90s and early 2000s.  These years become the turning point of U.S. 
perspective on the Alliance.   
 
By the mid 2000s calls from U.S. administrations and defense department officials surface for 
increased defense spending among their European allies in NATO.  U.S. foreign policy begins to shift 
focus from a European continental focus to one of a global commitment, and Europeans start to feel 
the American sentiment toward NATO souring.  Interoperability and force projections concerns arisen 
 
5 (SPIRI, 2019) 
6 The NATO average defense expenditure as measured by percent GDP investment was above 4% 
from 1960-1963, after which it remained above 3% until 1987 where it took its first dip below the 3% 
mark in the history of NATO. (All calculations reference the SIPRI Wold Bank database of 1960-2019 
(SPIRI, 2019) 
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from NATO involvement in Afghanistan, and the shortcomings identified during the execution of 
NATO lead actions in Libya highlighted the growing divide in U.S. and NATO member capabilities 
and interoperability shortfalls.  By the time of the 2014 Wales Summit, the U.S. view of NATO had 
reached a point where there was a requirement for European NATO to demonstrate their resolve to 
increasing the European commitment to credible deterrence.  The proposed 2% GDP defense spending 
investment metric proposed at the 2006 Riga Summit was heavily supported by the United States and 
was finally adopted in 2014 as the quantifiable metric by which to measure burden for all members 
within the Alliance. 
 
3.1 Funding NATO 
 
There are many different forms of financial support provided to the alliance by each individual 
member nation; however, in terms of burden sharing the only financial commitment that counts are the 
investment made at home.  As the old saying goes, “Pay yourself first, and invest the rest.”  That is to 
say, you have to invest in yourself in order to be stable for those you support.  NATO is no different.  
Individual country defense and force development investment is considered to be an indirect funding 
source to NATO operations as it is directly tied to a country’s Article 3 obligation to maintain a 
credible force.   
 
The commitment made at home by individual members to develop and maintain a force capable of 
providing a credible deterrent effect is seen by the United States as an expression of political will and 
commitment to the Alliance core task of European security (Techau, 2015).  The 2% metric is how the 
U.S. measures this member commitment.  As previously stated, even though the 2% metric was not 
formally adopted by the Alliance until 2014, it has been a dominant factor in the debate since the Cold 
War era.  Even though many NATO members maintained a defense expenditure above the 2% mark, 
there was still, according to the United States, a significant imbalance in investment concerning 
economic input to European security between European NATO and the United States.  
 
Burden-sharing issues were part and parcel of NATO politics in the years from 
its inception to the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Most of the impetus for the often-
heated disputes about the fair distribution of burdens was provided by 
Washington and in particular by a Congress determined to avoid European 
freeriding on American efforts.  This was the main pattern of transatlantic 
burden-sharing during the Cold War.  Although other indicators were being 
employed in intra-alliance comparisons of the individual countries’ contributions 
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spending as percentage of GDP – that is, the input side of national defense 
equations took precedence.8 
~Jens Ringsmose, Head of Department of Military Operations  
University of Southern Denmark 
 
Thus, the dwindling European defense budgets and resultant loss of credible deterrent effect was seen 
by the United States as a Europe willing to free-ride on U.S. investment in the European continent’s 
security (Deni, 2017, p. 75).  In his address to NATO on 10 June 2011 U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates made a statement concerning U.S. resolve on commitment to the European continent:  
“The U.S. share of NATO defense spending has now risen to over 75 percent…If current trends in the 
decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders may 
not consider the return of America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”9         
3.2 The 2% Metric  
 
By its very nature an alliance incurs a disproportionate burden among individual members.  The 
literature on this topic cites many factors which impact individual member burden associated with 
collective action.  Many of these factors are not defined by military measure, and the impact of a 
unitary or coalition action by one party, may well incur burden on non-participating members within 
the Alliance.  Geography, economic status, political influence, societal investment, and impact to 
infrastructure (Ringsmose, 2010) are just a few variables each member will shoulder differently during 
any specified event.  In their assessment of potential elements discussed within the burden-sharing 
debate Cimbala and Forster mention resultant population growth, urbanization, ecological disaster, 
mass migration of displaced persons, and armed insurrection as few of myriad examples of non-
military burdens which impact individual nations in different ways but are difficult to attribute or 
quantify in terms of the NATO burden debate.10  The impact severity and recovery time associated 
with any one of these factors will vary depending on the initial strength of the individual country in 
which they occur.  These individual burdens ebb and flow over time as various crises and conflicts test 
the cohesiveness of the collective.   
 
 
8 (Ringsmose, 2010, p. 325) 
9 (Gates, 2011b) 
10 (Cimbala & Kent Forster, 2017, p. 117)  Cimbala and Forster are faculty members in the deptarment of 
Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, Media, PA, U.S.A and College of Information Sciences & 
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Collective action requires give and take, including the occasional acceptance of unequal costs and 
benefits among members in order to achieve peace and security objectives.11  During the Cold war era 
the U.S. accepted a greater share of the burden  (Deni, 2017; Ringsmose, 2010).  Burden sharing 
within a collective alliance could be defined as long term give and take associated with the 
relationship rather than short term immediate gain or loss of a single defined factor (Becker & Military 
Academy West Point, 2012).  While the debate over burden sharing has had many different focus 
points over the years, the fact is that NATO was created as a military alliance whose primary objective 
is collective defense and deterrence.   
 
Even though there exist ancillary economic, political, and other associated costs to NATO 
membership the requirement for a credible military force lies foremost in the NATO modus operandi.  
This requirement is rooted in Articles 3 and 5 of the Washington Treaty.  Article 5, known to most as 
the binding article of collective defense and response, ensures a unified NATO response to an attack 
against any one NATO member.  It does not however require all members to respond on equal terms. 
 
Article 5 of the founding Washington Treaty of 1949 states that each member, in the exercise of their 
right to individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking [such action as it deems necessary] to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.12 This implies that while collective action 
may be determined by the council; individual state support may vary depending on their own 
interpretation of any given situation.  Thus, a vote to declare an Article 5 action does not incur the 
burden of equal military response among all members. 
 
So how do you quantify the burden quantitatively?  The commitment of troops or logistical support as 
a quantifiable metric is not a good measure of burden sharing.  For example, a military commitment 
from a force the size of the United States cannot be equally measured against that of a country the size 
of Albania.  Likewise, it is difficult to quantify the cost associated with the non-military use of 
 
11 (Cimbala & Kent Forster, 2017, p. 115) 
12 Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, 
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognised by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security 
Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
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political capital expended to influence an aggressor.   The quantifiable commitment of a large number 
of troops from a country whose military is not interoperable with the main force could be seen as a 
detractor to an armed military action.  The burden sharing debate has been around for years and did 
not start with the first and only Article 5 declaration by the North Atlantic Council on 12 September 
2001.   Article 5 collective action is not the driving force behind the burden debate.   
 
Article 3 is the anchor of the NATO alliance and provides the teeth to Article 5.  Article 3 requires all 
participating members to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed 
attack.13  Article 3 also implies maintaining a credible deterrent capability for the NATO military use 
of force.  This requirement is directly tied to armed aggression and military capability; not generic 
response which could be measured by political, social, geographical, or other economic metrics.  
Military capability is born of economic investment in the force itself.  To train, man, equip, maintain, 
and ensure relevance requires economic investment and continuous development of capability to meet 
the ever-changing advancements in military means.  In order to maintain interoperability of forces 
within an multi-national alliance, a baseline of technological compatibility and advancement must be 
maintained ("Funding NATO," 2019). These agreements and guidelines fall within the indirect 
funding line.  It is the individual country’s responsibility to meet these measures as a member of the 
Alliance.  This is the root of the 2% GDP defense spending initiative.  
 
 
3.3 United States Burden “Shaping” 
 
The United States has shaped the burden sharing debate to their advantage resulting in the 2014 Wales 
Summit outcome to use 2% GDP as the defined metric among NATO members.  Detractors of the 
current 2% GDP agreement argue that: First, you cannot use a simple quantitative measure of percent 
GDP investment in defense spending without tying that investment to a defined quantitative capability 




13 Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, 
by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
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Dr. Dominika Kunertova of the Center for War Studies in Denmark believes the 2% metric makes a 
“triumph of simplicity over complexity, [and] detracts NATO from its real capability problem”14 by 
not accounting for output metrics.  NATO scholar Jens Ringsmose of the University of Southern 
Denmark and the Royal Danish Defense Academy acknowledges that burden sharing during the cold 
war era was pre-dominantly defined by the input metric of defense spending.  He identifies the post-
Cold War dynamic change to military power projection spearheaded by the United States resulting in 
smaller members attempting to re-focus the burden discussion to more qualitative output variables 
enabling free-riding among members.  Smaller European members “vigorously sought to promote 
other measures of contribution to common defense”15 such as humanitarian aid packages or voluntary 
support to UN peacekeeping initiatives as valid contributions to NATO credible deterrence and 
defense posture.  Including such “expenditures” as valid inputs would enable members to demonstrate 
inputs and avoiding actual defense investment expenses while still benefiting from the security of the 
Alliance provided by those maintaining and developing credible forces, or “free-riding” according to 
Ringsmose.  
 
Kunertova points out the indicators identified by different economists and rational-choice theorists as 
operating through a lens of a private-public goods divide.16  The product provided by NATO (defense, 
deterrence, and security) is seen as a collective public good, and contributions are voluntarily made 
through the indirect funding contributions of individual members.  According to Dr. Kunertova, as the 
NATO strategy evolved to include contributions to UN humanitarian operations and aid provided to 
international NGOs, the methods for measuring burden sharing also evolved and began to take on a 
more complex structure.  Cold War scholars and economists used quantifiable indicators of financial 
input and capability output.  After the Cold War and as NATO membership expanded, less 
quantifiable mixed civilian-military indicators were used (Ringsmose, 2010).  
 
Many burdens resultant of state interaction are direct results of political agreements and geography.  
Immigration laws, foreign aid agreements, individual economic strength, etc. are all individual state 
factors which directly affect the associated generally defined burden placed on each individual nation 
(Ringsmose, 2010; Seigel, 2009; Sperling & Webber, 2009).  The European economic crisis of 2008-
2012 had a significant and disproportionate impact among member states within the European 
continent.  These additional burdens are not the subject of this discussion, but are worth mentioning, 
 
14 (Kunertova, 2017, p. 554) 
15 (Ringsmose, 2010, p. 321) 
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as they do have impact on individual member economic and budgetary factors concerning military 
investment decisions.   
 
It is not possible to share all burdens of a 30-member alliance equally.  That is an unrealistic 
expectation.  Likewise, credible deterrence is questionable in an alliance that is reliant on one member 
providing the majority of this credibility.  Christian Mölling, a research associate for the International 
Security Division, Stifung Wissenschaft und Politik in association with a report published by the 
Brookings Center on the United States and Europe, reported that even before the [2008 European] 
economic downturn there was a discrepancy between the speed at which the U.S. and European 
members modernized their military capabilities – leading many to suggest that NATO was already a 
multi-tier alliance (Molling, 2012, p. 8).  A model created with a single point of failure is not a sound 
strategy, and NATO is no exception.   
The United States is the principle provider of security guarantees (Ringsmose, 2010, p. 323). From the 
U.S. perspective, Washington requires an alliance that serves Washington’s national strategic goals.  
To this day, many NATO countries view NATO membership as a passport to the U.S. security 
guarantee.  Dr. John R. Deni of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute says that 
states balance military means either externally by forming alliances, or internally by spending more on 
defense.  He believes the assessment of international threats to security form the most important 
systemic variable to influence an actor to either invest directly in their own capabilities, or to rely on 
the alliance (free-ride).17  According to Kunertova, “As a way to measure an increase in military 
capability the 2% metric is barely useful.  It does not measure spending in real terms or actual output.  
It does show who is and is not committed to NATO’s core task of European security.”18  As long as 
members continue to see membership as an entry ticket to American security guarantees and as long as 
the U.S. maintains an ability to exclude their aid to members, the U.S. holds a distinct bargaining chip 
to influencing member contributions (Ringsmose, 2010, p. 335) 
 
Since the early 2000’s U.S. national security assessments have drawn focus away from Europe toward 
not only Southeast Asia, bot toward a globally focused influence.   The United States no longer enjoys 
a position as the sole post-Cold War superpower.  Increasing non-European pressures on the interests 
of the United States draws U.S. resources and focus away from Europe and requires an alliance with 
allies who are active members.  Members who are able and willing to project force with relevant 
capabilities or provide for their own credible defense and deterrence in the event the U.S. is decisively 
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engaged out of area.  The alliances they invest in need to be mutually beneficial, and NATO was 
formed as a military alliance.  The United States will continue to use its considerable influence to 
apply pressure against member contributions as a demonstration of Alliance commitment.  They will 
rely on other agreements such as the Defense Capabilities Initiative, Major Equipment Spending 
Guidelines, and the Smart Defense concept to shape the output variables resultant of those 
investments.  To the United States, it is the initial investment of funds which primarily demonstrates 
Alliance member will and commitment enabling greater interoperability and transformation of the 
NATO force to maintain a credible partner to meet American national security objectives.   
4 U.S. foreign policy  
 
U.S. foreign policy, guided by the National Security Strategy (NSS), is driven by the guidance and 
various policy positions of the current administration.  The interplays between the different branches 
of the U.S. government often have a direct impact on the viability of attaining the goals professed by 
the NSS.  This makes it possible to assess U.S. foreign policy regarding NATO from a presidential 
administration, congressional, or economic perspective.   
 
As head of the executive branch of the U.S. government, the President is responsible for providing the 
direction and guidance necessary to shape U.S. foreign policy.   The NSS reflects the guidance from 
the President of the United States to the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense.  The 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is penned every four years by the military Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) and reflects how the military intends to fulfil their obligation to support the NSS.  The QDR 
defines the requirements which drive U.S. budget decisions concerning defense spending.  These two 
documents provide the guidance and direction which drive policy, doctrine, and economic investment 
decisions for the country.    
 
I have chosen to focus on the impact of the Executive branch of U.S. government vice the Congress 
which represents the Legislative branch.  The reason for this is because it is the executive branch, not 
the legislative, which drives U.S. foreign policy and decision.  U.S. policy is inextricably tied to and 
defined by each administration regardless of which parties control the elements of the Legislative 
branch of U.S. government.  The Legislative branch does not set policy directives.  It passes laws to 
enable or limit the powers of the Executive branch, and approves budgets intended to support and 
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It is the policies of each administration which drive the foreign policy decisions of the Department of 
State, and the military decisions of the Department of Defense.  In the following sections I will focus 
on the Presidential perspective and its influence on shaping NATO member defense spending.  For my 
purposes the executive perspective includes statements and actions of those within the Presidential 
Cabinet such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.      
 
5 NATO and U.S. Policy 
 
5.1 What does NATO mean to U.S. policy? 
 
There is no doubt that European stability still plays a significant role in U.S. security strategy, as is 
noted in every NSS and QDR document ever produced by the U.S. Government.  However, over the 
years since the collapse of the Soviet Union the U.S. assessment of their own security environment has 
continued to develop beyond the scope of a European focus.  Europe no longer holds as prominent and 
solitary a standing in U.S. security as it did during the days of the Cold War.  With the United States 
focusing on global strategic initiatives and modernization they require allies who are willing to 
progress with the times.  Allies who invest in themselves in order to be in a position to be of assistance 
to others.   
 
There is much discussion among NATO members concerning the U.S. commitment to the alliance.  
There is also much discussion within the United States concerning the European commitment to their 
own defense.  The discussion has continued in various degrees for decades; however, it picked up 
notable momentum after the 2011 announcement of the “pivot to the Pacific” by then Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton19.  Will the U.S. abandon the Alliance in favor of a focus on southeast Asia?  The 
discussion was punctuated again during the fallout over the level of U.S. involvement during the 2011 
Libya campaign where NATO operational shortcomings were laid bare20 and the degree of future U.S. 
involvement in Alliance actions was left to question.   
 
 
19 (H. Clinton, 2011) 
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The Alliance does not deny its reliance on U.S. military power,21 and the U.S. does not deny that a 
safe and secure European continent is part of U.S. strategic objectives.  The U.S. is concerned with the 
effectiveness of the European member commitment to the NATO military alliance.  NATO has 
become a two-tier security relationship (Gates, 2011b).  It was Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel who 
called the end of the Cold War one of the biggest obstacles to Alliance investment.  He noted that 
Europeans viewed the end of the Cold War as the end to insecurity in Europe and the end of 
aggression by nation-states.  Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 he addressed the 
NATO defense ministers at the Forum on NATO Expansion and European Security where he 
chastised them and gave a warning concerning the American commitment:  “Russia has tested NATO.  
Future generations will note whether at this moment – this moment of challenge – we summoned the 
will to invest in our alliance…America is still spending 3 times the Allied combined defense 
spending…Russia’s actions in Ukraine have shattered the myth [of non-aggressive nation state 
relationships and interactions.] ”22   
 
The discussion of the European commitment was re-ignited most recently by President Trump leading 
up to his first summit in 2018 when he called for NATO members to pay for their share of the 
European defense investment.23  With President Trump’s administration, it is about “putting your 
money where your mouth is.”  Always a flare for the dramatic, he does not leave much room for 
political lip service in his debate style.  While President Trump may be one of the most vocal 
administrations, his does not represent the only vocal administration in the recent history of the U.S.-
NATO investment relationship.  There have been many administration officials and government 
representatives over the last 30 years which have fueled this U.S. narrative in an attempt to spur 
NATO members to contribute more money to defense spending.   
 
In his book The U.S. NATO Debate, Magnus Petersson defines the characterization of NATO in U.S. 
foreign policy as being of less strategic importance than it was during the Cold War.  He writes that 
“despite the Ukraine Crisis, the long-term trend in the debate is that the United States is neither 
capable nor interested in taking care of Europe’s security problems more permanently as it did during 
 
21 See The Politics of 2%: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe (Techau, 2015) and Security without the 
United States?: Europe’s Perception of NATO (Naumann, 2009) 
22 (Hagel, 2014) 
23 See Trump Says NATO Allies Don’t Pay Their Share (Baker, 2017), Sharing the Burden? U.S. Allies, Defense 
Spending, And the Future of NATO (Richter, 2016), and Donald Trump’s Remarks Rattle NATO Allies and Stoke 
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the Cold War.  The main reason for that is the decreased military ability and political will to engage in 
regions that are not of first strategic priority for the United States.”24   
 
Today’s NATO Strategic Concept defines three core tasks: Collective Defense, Crisis Management 
and Cooperative Security.25 It states that in order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as 
effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, 
modernization and transformation.26 This statement implies that all members must contribute to the 
effectiveness of the alliance. From the United States perspective, this has been an issue of address 
since President John F. Kennedy espoused a vision of NATO allies and the United States cooperating 
on a basis of full equality as early as 1962.27 
 
5.2 U.S. Means of Influencing NATO 
 
The two-tier relationship within NATO identified by Mölling28 indicates the reliance of NATO on 
U.S. military capability (and presence) to maintain a credible deterrent effect (Ringsmose, 2010).  
Considering this direct link between U.S. military capability and NATO credible deterrence, it is not a 
far stretch to say that U.S. foreign policy changes have a direct effect, an influence, on Alliance 
initiatives.  NATO’s capability to maintain both its initiative for a peaceful and prosperous European 
continent while maintaining a credible deterrent posture has relied heavily on U.S. economic and 
direct military investment.  A change to U.S. foreign policy which decreases the focus on the 
European continent has a direct impact to NATO’s credible deterrence posture.  In the future, if the 
United States determines participating in a conflict not to be in line with their national interest or 
security concerns, NATO will be left to source and execute that operation with limited or no U.S. 
military support.  NATO received a taste of this during the Libya campaign in 2011 when limited U.S. 
participation and leadership resulted in the Alliance struggling against a poorly armed regime in a 
sparsely populated country (Gates, 2011b).  This reliance on U.S. military capability weakens 
European NATO credibility.  Engagements such as the one in Libya which highlight NATO’s reliance 
on the United States further intensifies the influence of calls from the United States to increase 
 
24 (Petersson, 2015, p. 2) 
25 (Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010, pp. 7,8) 
26 (Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010, p. 9) 
27 Taken from remarks by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta at the 2012 Munich Security Conference. 
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member defense spending.29  It is difficult to draw a direct correlation between these actions by the 
United States and resultant defense spending as measured in this thesis; however, it can be argued the 
impact of this demonstration of resolve on the part of the United States was likely influential to 
Alliance members leading up to the 2014 Wales Summit. 
 
6 Post-Cold War Administration Influences 
 
President Trump has made it a recurrent soundbite since taking office that he believes the U.S. burden 
of investment in Europe is disproportionate in terms of both economic military investment and direct 
military troop commitment to the continent.  He repeatedly mentioned the costs associated with 
deploying and maintaining both the missile defense systems located across the continent, as well as the 
65,000 U.S. troops strategically positioned there.30  However, his admonishment of NATO members 
concerning this topic is only an echo of previous administrations.  This has been a recurrent drumbeat 
of U.S. policy in relation to NATO for many years and has spanned multiple administrations in 
Washington D.C. since the turn of the century.   
 
A United States post-Cold War foreign policy review reveals a dynamic change in U.S. prioritization 
of NATO member defense investment.  U.S. policy changed from one that was centrally focused on 
countering a localized threat to that of global interdependence and influence.  During the first decade 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States ushered in a focus of stability through 
democracy to NATO.  During this period, under the Clinton administration, the U.S. was more than 
happy to fully bear all the costs of this NATO initiative: leadership, military footprint, and economic 
costs.  It was part of a broader U.S. strategic initiative to expand economic prominence and democratic 
ideals which they believed would further strengthen and stabilize an uncertain region.  The following 
decades witnessed a change to U.S. foreign policy and involvement in coalition actions, administration 
rhetoric, and eroding public support for continued one-sided investment in European defense and 
deterrence.   
 
A review of the National Security Strategies and Quadrennial Defense Reviews from each post-Cold 
War administration demonstrates a slow but steady change to U.S. focus of military effort and 
 
29 See (Ringsmose, 2010, p. 335) and (Kunertova, 2017) concerning U.S. influence to NATO member spending 
based on reliance of U.S. military credibility impact to member investment, and European defense spending 
influence on U.S. perception of NATO member commitment.  
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influence which trends away from being centered on the European continent.  This review also reveals 
increasing calls from U.S. administration officials to NATO members to increase their efforts 
concerning individual responsibility and investment in the development of a credible defense which 
reduces its reliance on the United States.        
 
6.1 George H.W. Bush Era (1989-1993) 
 
The first out of area conflict following the fall of the Soviet Union came with the Persian Gulf war of 
1990-1991 following the attempted Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.  Iraq’s military occupation of Kuwait 
was an attempt to gain access to that country’s rich oil reserves and extricate itself from the debt they 
had accrued with Kuwait.  The United Nations first responded with global sanctions against Iraq.  
After those sanctions failed to depose the Iraqi occupation, the UN issued an ultimatum.  If Iraqi 
forces did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, the UN would authorize use of force to 
remove them.  At this time, the strength of the anti-Iraq UN coalition force had reached 700,000 troops 
and included forces from NATO, Egypt, and a small collection of Arab nations.  The United States 
supplied 540,000, or 77% of the ground forces to support the UN sanctioned action.31  Though the 
Gulf War was seen by the United States as a beacon of light for coalition operations and UN actions, 
European NATO participation was extremely limited.  The primary NATO members associated with 
Gulf War military action were the United States, Great Britain and France.  Most other NATO 
Alliance members were either unable or unwilling to project power beyond Europe’s borders during 
this conflict.   
 
The 1991 National Security Strategy issued by President George H.W. Bush issued after the 
conclusion of the Gulf War speaks volumes to the view the United States had of the post-Cold War 
world stage.  The 1991 NSS is a document marked by hopeful but cautious optimism that makes direct 
references to fragile fledgling democracies in countries whose civilizations have ancient ties to 
destabilizing ideals.   
 
“A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration – an opportunity.  We must 
recognize the stark fact that our hopeful new era still has within it dislocations 
and dangers that threaten the fragile shoots of democracy and progress that have 
recently emerged.  It is important that we not let euphoria over the easing of East-
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West confrontation blind us to the potential security problems within a new 
Europe.” 
~President George H.W. Bush32 
 
The Gulf War was the first major commitment of U.S. forces after the Cold War and signified the start 
of a change in the gravitational pull on U.S. forces to a more global construct.  The United States did 
not see the former Soviet Union as a beaten foe slinking back to the shadows, but more as a 
disheartened combatant.  With the primary Asian continental superpower in decline, the 1991 NSS 
identified new threats to U.S. strategic initiatives and national security likely to emerge.  The 
document espouses concern over both nuclear and non-nuclear arms proliferation.  It recognized that 
the new insular focus of the Russians was likely to leave an opening for other, less prominent, actors 
to attempt to grab for prominence and influence within the international mainstream.  The United 
States recognized the UN response and leadership during the Gulf War as an indicator that the UN had 
been “truly vindicated and rejuvenated” as an institution, and believed future military actions were 
likely to be solved with “hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies but also nations with 
whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic and military cooperation or, indeed even a 
common political or moral outlook.”33   
 
The U.S. announced its vision of the new world order in the 1991 NSS was the first call to a change in 
U.S. foreign policy and military force structure which should have alerted Europe to a new U.S.-
NATO dynamic.  The end of the Cold War ushered in hesitant optimism on the part of the United 
States.  The Gulf War changed the United States’ view of the UN.  They now viewed the UN as 
empowered to meet the intention of its founders as a unifying leader backed by the ability to rally an 
international coalition response force.  The increase in UN prominence meshed well with the U.S. 
ambition to expand their global focus beyond that of the Cold War era.  The reduced regional 
influence of the Soviet Union left a power vacuum in the Middle East. Washington recognized Europe 
as an area of strategic significance, but also predicted a rise in ambition of formerly subdued actors 
emboldened by an increase in arms proliferation as a challenge to U.S. interests.   
 
“Europe remains a central strategic arena, the Gulf crisis reminded us how much 
our interests can be affected in other regions as well.  The east-Asia and Pacific 
regions include some of the last traditional Communist regimes on the face of the 
globe.”  
 
32 (National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, pp. 1, 7-8) 
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~United States 1991 National Security Strategy34  
 
The reduced demand on U.S. military force along the Eastern European front, and the view of a 
strengthened and influential UN allowed the U.S. to shift focus away from European interests.  
According to the NSS, the United States assessed one of the greatest threats to European stability 
during this period was support for their fledgling democracies along the eastern flank.  The document 
expresses concern for the “continued freedom, vitality, and national independence of the new Eastern 
European democracies are also critical to the new structure of peace we seek to build throughout 
Europe.”35  This new-found freedom to pursue a more global reach also demanded a change to force 
structure outlined in the 1991 NSS.  It identifies the need to transform the U.S. military to one of rapid 
deployment and reconstitution with global reach and persistence – signifying the push toward a 
lighter, more responsive, and less conventional military force design.36   
 
The 1991 NSS makes no direct mention of NATO member commitment, or the U.S. burden 
concerning their relationship with NATO.  The United States does, however, express concern over 
member participation and commitment to alliances in general when it makes the statement:  
 
“We cannot be the world’s policeman…[the] world community must share the 
danger and risk…[and their] commitments backed by tangible action.”   
~United States 1991 National Security Strategy37  
 
Over the following years, the United States would begin reducing its footprint in Europe as they re-
balanced their forces to support global strategic initiatives.  There would be increasing calls to alliance 
members and coalition partners to back their political lip service with tangible action; however, the 
influence of U.S. foreign policy on NATO commitments during this period can be assessed as low 
impact.  There was no formal administration documentation or strong rhetoric supporting demands on 
the European continent concerning defense posture during this period.  The United States would not be 
truly re-focused to the European continent again until almost 23 years later in 2014 when the Russian 
bear marked its first real strategic grab at power since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
 
34 (National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, pp. 7, 9) 
35 (National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, p. 7) 
36 (National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991, p. 31) 
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6.2 Clinton Era (1993-2001) 
 
Many members of the United States military refer to the 1990’s as the peacetime years of our 
country’s fighting forces.  A time of stagnation defined by a lack of refinement in strategic force 
shaping, acquisitions or advancement in doctrine.  This may also provide an accurate depiction of the 
US-NATO relationship during this period, and it was driven by the Clinton era foreign policy founded 
on regionally focused alliance relationships with regionally focused influence.  Clinton’s policy of 
engaged global leadership was married to a domestic policy which spurred the American public to 
support all facets (and costs) of maintaining and expanding American prominence in foreign domains.  
However, by the end of the Clinton era the wheels of change had started in motion beneath the surface.  
Change was coming, but like many large muscle movements of any government, it would be a slow 
change.  The effects of which would not be felt for years to come but would have a ripple effect across 
the globe.       
 
President Clinton’s first published National Security Strategy in 1994 was titled the “Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement”.  The overarching theme of the Clinton era national security strategy 
was supporting the spread of democratic ideals and expanding the world’s free market economies 
through dynamic U.S. leadership.  Where the previous administration leveled cautious optimism 
concerning the state of the world order regarding the end of the Cold War, President Clinton made his 
opinion on the matter crystal clear in his opening statement of the 1994 NSS:  “The central security 
challenge of the past half century – the threat of communist expansion – is gone.”38  The bedrock of 
his stated central goals would be realized by increasing U.S. national security through a focused plan 
of active leadership and engagement around the globe.  
 
From a military perspective the 1994 NSS identified a desire to build on the successes of the Gulf War 
UN actions through active leadership and support to the United Nations peacekeeping initiatives and a 
pledge to both meet and exceed all US pledges of economic and military support to the organization.  
This was seen by President Clinton as part of the initiative to promote democracy not just within 
NATO, but on the world stage.  Most mentions of NATO within the 1994 document begin with the 
statement, “Through U.S. leadership, NATO has been able to…”, demonstrating his idea of engaged 
U.S. leadership within the organization.  The Clinton era focus on engaged U.S. leadership was not 
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intended to be only political in nature.  The only mention of the burden to the U.S. in the 1994 
document was a direct statement of acceptance and commitment:  
 
“We can only engage actively abroad if the American people and the Congress 
are willing to bear the costs of that leadership – in dollars, political energy and, at 
times, American lives.” 
~President Bill Clinton (National Security Strategy, 1994) 
 
The U.S. had begun refocusing its military posture to reflect the global initiatives espoused in both this 
and the previous administration’s NSS documents.  This demanded an increased focus in areas 
previously all but ignored.  The United States, up to this point, had focused military strategic efforts in 
two general regions; European and Western Pacific (Southeast Asian) credible deterrence efforts.  The 
defeat of Saddam Hussein’s attempt to secure Kuwaiti resources in the early 90’s did not reduce 
tensions in the middle east after the Gulf War was settled.  The pressure remained as tensions 
increased concerning the security of vital regional oil reserves, increasing the relevance of the region 
as a new strategic focal point for the United States.  The 1991 NSS call to restructure the military 
forces of the United States to meet the challenges of a global focus had already started by 1994.  The 
U.S. had reduced their force footprint in Europe, increased their presence in Southeast Asia and 
augmented both by forward deployed naval forces to meet the desires of achieving a credible deterrent 
posture.39 
 
The 1994 NATO Summit in January was a landmark event marked by NATO approval of the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative.  The PfP was a U.S. initiative delivered at the summit by 
President Clinton in an effort to bind the former communist states to the rest of Europe.  By the fall of 
the same year 21 countries, including Russia, had joined the PfP agreement.  Leading up to the 
summit, President Clinton embarked on a campaign to reassure Europeans of the American 
commitment to European stability through democracy.  He called on Europe to invest in their future 
saying the United States “will benefit more from a strong and equal partner than from a weak 
one…Europe as a whole cannot be secure if the eastern half remains in turmoil.”40  He saw the PfP as 
a stepping stone toward NATO inclusion that was less threatening to Moscow than the rapid outright 
accession of Poland, Hungary and other Eastern European nations being called for by some NATO 
 
39 (National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1994, p. 22) 
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members.  Addressing a multinational audience, the day before the summit President Clinton 
remarked on his proposed Partnership for Peace initiative saying: 
 
“This partnership [for peace] will advance a process of evolution for NATO's 
formal enlargement. It looks to the day when NATO will take on new members 
who assume the Alliance's full responsibilities. It will create a framework in 
which former communist states and others not now members of NATO can 
participate with NATO members in joint military planning, training, exercises 
and other efforts. This partnership will build new bonds of cooperation among 
the militaries of the East and the West. It will reinforce the development of 
democracies and democratic practices.” 
~ President Clinton, Multinational Address, 9 Jan 199441 
The PfP demonstrated an instrumental link in the administration’s plans for promoting democracy in 
the region and served as the bedrock of the NATO expansion that followed.  The PfP initiative also 
demonstrates U.S. ability to influence NATO initiatives to align with U.S. national interests.    
 
“The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation 
throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build 
strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and 
commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.  This new 
programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a 
Partnership for Peace.  Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play 
an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.” 
~Declaration of Heads of State and Government, 1994 Brussels Summit42 
The Clinton Administration’s 1997 NSS remained steadfast to the objectives of the previous 1994 
NSS and re-stated the American resolve to shoulder all of the costs associated with an engaged 
leadership role on the world stage in the pursuit of America’s strategic agenda.  In his State of the 
Union address the President re-confirmed the prominence of European stability to American national 
security as one of America’s top priorities when he stated, “When Europe is stable, prosperous and at 
peace, America is more secure.”43  During his speech he outlined his vision of leading the expansion 
of NATO to include the first new members by 1999 and cementing the new Russian democracy within 
 
41 (W. Clinton, 1994b) 
42 (Brussels Summit Declaration, 1994) 
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the PfP commitment.  The ’97 NSS released two months later cemented this vision with the following 
statement:  
 
”Our objective is to complete the construction of a truly integrated, democratic 
and secure Europe, with a democratic Russia as a full participant. This would 
complete the mission the United States launched 50 years ago with the Marshall 
Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO remains 
the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic 
security.”44 
~ U.S. National Security Strategy, 1997  
The first ever Department of Defense Quadrennial Review (QDR) of 1997 reaffirmed the U.S. 
commitment to the European/Southeast Asian focus of the United States national security strategy 
with a stated commitment to keep 100,000 military personnel in both locations.  This review was the 
first true call to divest from military capability investment, development, and maintenance of 
conventional force capabilities.  The 1997 QDR identifies the turn of the century as a period of 
technological proliferation which will enable both state and non-state actors with the ability to 
challenge the United States via unconventional or asymmetric means.   
 
This is significant to the NATO burden sharing discussion as it was the first official call to an 
adjustment of U.S. defense and deterrence capability development and acquisitions.  With the world’s 
technological advancement facilitating unprecedented access to asymmetric capabilities which could 
disrupt the U.S. war machine at a fraction of the cost associated with conventional methods, the 
United States had to alter its focus.  The United States began to focus on rapid deployment capability 
to new focus regions, less conventional force structures with a ‘lighter footprint’, and technological 
investment designed to keep pace with the advancement of technological innovation.   This major 
military modernization initiative was also mentioned in the 1997 NSS.   
 
This modernization initiative would separate the United States military capabilities from those who 
were choosing only to invest enough to maintain current capabilities or choosing to decrease 
investment and down-sizing their forces.  The result ended up manifesting in a divergence of 
interoperability within the Alliance on the European continent over the next decade.  Regardless of the 
stated U.S. willingness to shoulder the burden of expense associated with their involvement in 
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NATO45, this divergence of capability would prove to be a future point of contention.  This fact was 
not lost on then Secretary General Lord George Robertson who during the 1999 Washington Summit 
made a call to the Defense Capabilities Initiative “to ensure that all allies not only remain 
interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face new security 
challenges.”46   
 
Regarding NATO enlargement, the United States continued to push for new member accession by 
1999.  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright addressed the NATO member leadership in Brussels at 
the NATO 50th anniversary celebration leading up to the 1997 Madrid Summit.  She told the 
assembled leadership the U.S. desired accession of members prepared and ready to accept the burdens 
associated with NATO membership.  She did not mince words in the view that the United States 
wanted expansion through members who were willing participants and not free-riders of NATO 
protection.   
 
“We should inform aspirants clearly what they must do to meet the political and 
military conditions for membership, and we should be candid about 
shortcomings.  They should be prepared to fulfill as many obligations of 
membership as possible on the day they join…We understand that if we are to 
achieve for Europe the kind of future we all want, we have to manage the 
evolution of this alliance correctly – we have to get it right.” 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, NATO 50th Anniversary, Brussels47  
 
It is interesting to note that the United States viewed itself as the sole superpower of the day, and it 
expected to remain so throughout the 1997-2015 period.48  One of the assumptions made in the 1997 
QDR is that the period between the turn of the century and 2015 was predicted to be one ‘marked by 
the absence of a “global peer competitor” able to challenge the United States militarily around the 
world as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.’49  It was also mentioned that it was assessed as 
‘unlikely for any regional power or coalition to amass sufficient conventional military strength in the 
 
45 See 1991 and 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy documents (National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement, 1997; National Security Strategy of the United States, 1991)  
46 (Lord Robertson, G. 2000) 
47 (M. K. Albright, ,Secretary of State, 1997) 
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next 10 to 15 years to defeat our armed forces, once the full military potential of the United States is 
mobilized and deployed to the region of conflict’.50   
 
The announced military modernization of 1997 plays a prominent role in the future divergence of the 
US-NATO relationship.  It serves as foreshadowing to the coming divestment of direct U.S. heavy-
handed leadership in NATO and the first muted call to a mutually shared burden of investment within 
the Alliance which came about with the 2000 NSS titled “A National Security Strategy for the Global 
Age”.  President Clinton identifies the Global Age as one of interdependence where, regardless of any 
one individual nation’s power or prosperity, future prosperity relies on world powers working 
together.  His vision was inclusive, not isolationist.  At a time of what can be seen as the height of U.S. 
great power dominance the President of the United States called interdependence “the defining feature 
of our age” (W. Clinton, 2000).  The significance of this statement coupled with his administration’s 
mantra of engaged leadership and acceptance of all burdens economic, military, and political therein 
associated would certainly lead NATO members to believe their declining economic investments in 
defense spending over the past decade were not a concern of the United States.  However, the 
following statement in the opening remarks of the 2000 NSS made by President Clinton is the first 
muted call for America’s allies to start pulling their weight.  Both a statement and a request to the 
allies of America’s various alliances around the globe.  A muted call which would grow much louder 
and become more direct with each subsequent administration to follow. 
 
“The ability to assure global security, shared prosperity and freedom is beyond 
the power of any one nation. But the actions of many nations often follow from 
the actions of one.  America today has power and authority never seen before in 
the history of the world. We must continue to use it, in partnership with those 
who share our values, to seize the opportunities and meet the challenges of a 
global age.” 
~President Bill Clinton, 2000 National Security Strategy Preface51 
 
President Clinton’s final published National Security Strategy is also the first time the word ‘burden 
sharing’ appears in the text of a governing document of the United States.  The 2000 NSS makes an 
overt statement that the example set by the United States military investment and forward presence 
overseas allows for maximum military cooperation with allies and therefore encourages burden 
 
50 Ibid. 
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sharing.52  Although this is a general statement not tied directly to any identified metric of measure, it 
is the first time the United States mentions any type of shared allied burden associated with U.S. 
national objectives.  That is not to say the United States did not see their efforts at engaged leadership 
resulting in a positive change to NATO military involvement on the European continent.   
 
Operation Allied Force, the 11-week NATO-led 1999 Kosovo air campaign against the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians saw fourteen of the Alliance’s nineteen 
members actively participate.  This operation was the first high intensity air campaign ever conducted 
by NATO.53  Operation Allied Force proved a stark contrast to both Gulf War and Bosnian War 
NATO participation, and was seen by the United States as a triumph of their engaged leadership 
moving NATO toward an inclusive interdependence.  U.S. troops comprised only 15% of the NATO-
led KFOR occupation force54 and noted this operation by name in the 2000 NSS as a demonstration of 
NATO’s ability and willingness “to share more of the burden” concerning military action on the 
European continent. 
 
U.S. foreign policy influence on NATO commitments during this period can be assessed as a moderate 
impact.  The foreign policy espoused in the Clinton era NSS documentation obtained a response from 
NATO members in line with his rhetoric concerning Alliance posture and investment.  President 
Clinton’s foreign policy enabled and encouraged the negative trend in defense spending among NATO 
members.  His direct statements in the NSS concerning America’s obligation to bear the burden of 
costs associated with the defense of Europe and championing the increased level of NATO member 
participation during the Kosovo campaign signaled to NATO that the Alliance was meeting all U.S. 
desired outcomes.         
 
6.3 George W. Bush Era (2001-2009) 
On September 11, 2001, the United States came under vicious, 
bloody attack. Americans died in their places of work. They died 
 
52 See 2000 NSS Section on the Efficacy of Engagement: Enhancing Our Security at Home and Abroad. 
(National Security Strategy for a Global Age, 2000, p. 10) 
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on American soil. They died not as combatants, but as innocent 
victims. They died not from traditional armies waging traditional 
campaigns, but from the brutal, faceless weapons of terror. They died as 
the victims of war - a war that many had feared but whose sheer horror 
took America by surprise. 
~Opening remarks to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
 
Many believe it was the 9/11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror which drew the United States into 
the middle east and began their supposed withdrawal from a NATO alliance focus.  In reality this shift 
away from European focus in U.S. priorities was not driven by these attacks.  The groundwork for the 
shift in focus had already been laid in the early 90’s with recognition of globalization and 
interdependence of world markets and communication.  The War on Terror and subsequent NATO 
Article 5 declaration did however have a significant impact to NATO force structure and investment 
needs.   The War on Terror and the resultant actions in Afghanistan clearly pulled a disproportionate 
U.S. focus to the Middle East regional area of influence concerning U.S. warfighting capabilities and 
force structure.  This began the pull towards the US demand for regionally focused alliances with 
globally focused influence.   
 
The early 2000’s began an era of task organized military forces operating almost solely within the 
realm of unconventional asymmetric warfare defined by disproportionate force capabilities.  About as 
far from near peer competition as modern forces have ever experienced or been task organized to 
counter.  The result being the United States could no longer afford to absorb the position as primary 
guarantor of credible deterrence within the NATO alliance.   
 
If we look to the supporting documentation defining U.S. foreign policy and military force guidance 
and focus, we see that while the War on Terror was guiding the close fight, the administration was 
conducting shaping actions within U.S. strategy to continue developing a reaction force capable of 
global peer competition.  The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review becomes an anchoring document in 
this discussion.  It announces a fundamental change in the U.S. approach to global deterrence from the 
“threat-based” model of the past to a “capabilities-based” model for the future.  The new model 
focused not on a specific enemy or the location the United States expect to fight should deterrence fail; 
but on how an adversary will fight in the wars of the future.  It also redefined a focus on the national 
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The Quadrennial Defense Review was undertaken during a crucial time of 
transition to a new era. Even before the attack of September 11, 2001, the 
senior leaders of the Defense Department set out to establish a new 
strategy for America's defense that would embrace uncertainty and 
contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective 
abroad, America must be safe at home.  As we contend with the difficult 
challenges of the war on terrorism, we must also proceed on the path of 
transforming America's defense… and to honor America's commitments 
worldwide. 
~Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 2001 QDR55  
  
This was the first overt signal from the U.S. that involvement in Europe’s security and deterrence 
efforts was going to change.  The message, while unheeded by NATO members writ-large of that 
time, did not go unnoticed within the NATO discussion.   
 
Former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, registered 
concern over NATO’s ability to retain a credible capability of collective defense without the 
U.S. if Europe was to rely on the autonomous European defense forces.  He believed that task 
to be “undoable” over either the short or long term under the current conditions and member 
policies concerning defense investment of the time (Naumann, 2009, p. 60).  He addressed the 
need for Europeans to invest in their own capabilities in 2009 when he stated, “The tried-and-
true Cold War-era method of “outsourcing” security to the United States is no longer viable, 
not least because America’s role in the world has changed.”56 
 
This new position concerning the NATO military burden of investment manifested the following year 
in President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy.  It is in this document his administration lays out 
their desires for an expeditionary NATO force capable of meeting the capabilities-based demands of 
combating what the U.S. assesses to be the future of warfare and undefined actors of the new 
information and technological era.  A call to modernization and military investment among NATO 
members that would align NATO capabilities with their own modernization initiatives rooted in US 
National Security Strategy documentation.   
 
 
55 (2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001) 
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“NATO must build a capability to field, at short notice, highly mobile, specially 
trained forces whenever they are needed to respond to a threat against any 
member of the alliance.  The alliance must be able to act whenever our interests 
are threatened.” 
~2002 National Security Strategy statement on NATO military forces57   
 
The following bullet points taken from the 2002 NSS outlined the US expectation for changes to 
NATO, providing a stark contrast to the previous administration’s acceptance of the US burden of 
engaged leadership to the Alliance:  If NATO succeeds in enacting [the following] changes, the 
rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of its member states as was the 
case during the Cold War (Bush, 2002). 
• Expand NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden 
of defending and advancing out common interests; 
• Ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to 
make in coalition warfare; 
• Take advantage of technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending 
to transform NATO military forces so they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our 
vulnerabilities; 
• Take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces. 
 
The 2006 QDR announced two new initiatives which would directly affect US foreign policy.  First, a 
significantly increased investment and focus on U.S. domestic security development with the aim to 
transform the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, FBI, and intelligence community 
with specific guidance to focus on disruptive technologies in the realms of cyber and space 
operations.58  Second was to develop alliance capabilities to support Joint Task Force (JTF) 
organization.  This second effort was driven directly by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Peter Pace, who identified the military relationship among allies to be “in a state of transition 
from an interoperable to interdependent.  The key to success during this initiative will be to train, man, 
and equip [forces] to make them JTF capable, available, and ready…”   
 
The United States was continuing its military modernization effort as part of the national security 
policy.  During President Bush’s administration the United States turned back to being less 
 
57 (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, p. Sec VIII) 




*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the 






magnanimous concerning their willingness to shoulder the expense of coalition and alliance actions.  
The United States was still bearing the brunt of military equipment and personnel requirements for 
kinetic actions supplying more than 65% of ISAF forces in Afghanistan.59  The demand to increase 
U.S. focus at home in order to ensure safety and security domestically was pulling resources from 
funding previously used to support overseas force projection and shore up Alliance and coalition 
member shortfalls.  This demand required an increase in both U.S. defense spending as well as allied 
defense investment if the JTF concept was to come to fruition.  During the Bush Presidency defense 
spending rose from 2.94% GDP in 2001 to 4.66% GDP by the end of 2009 when President Obama 
inherited the White House.60  By comparison, non-US NATO average defense spending deteriorated 
from 1.94% to a meager 1.43% GDP over the same period.   
 
The preface to the 2006 NSS addresses the change to the US domestic situation at home and a 
population who was growing weary of the Clinton era policy of shouldering all costs of credible 
deterrence and the expansion of democratic ideals and governments.  There was also an 
acknowledgement that maybe the bilateral policies (Europe-US) of the past which ignored regional 
and global realities would be unlikely to succeed in a future world of interdependent world markets.61  
The document calls for a strategic focus which recognizes “a need for a global focus in relations with 
main centers of global power”62 like China and India.  Europe still remained a vital pillar of U.S. 
foreign policy, but the United States makes a direct statement that “NATO internal reforms must be 
accelerated to ensure NATO is capable to carry out its missions effectively” (Bush, 2006).  The 
patience with a partner that was slow to change and adapt to the what the United States viewed as a 
critical adjustment to both world-wide strategic relationships and resultant deterrence initiatives based 
on capabilities was wearing.  U.S. calls for “transformation” become synonymous to demands for an 
accelerated response to what they see as gaps in effective military alliance capabilities. 
 
There is much made of the U.S. initial call for inclusion of a 2% GDP defense spending initiative at 
the 2006 Riga Summit; however, there is no mention of a defense spending target in the Summit 
Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government63 after the summit conclusion.  Only a 
general statement to halt declines in defense spending among members of the Alliance.   
 
59 (NATO Troops in Afghanistan, 2011) 
60 ("Military Expenditure (% of GDP) Database," 2019) 
61 (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, p. 36) 
62 (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006, p. 36) 
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The U.S. position leading up to the Riga Summit is clearly stated during the congressional 
subcommittee hearing concerning NATO transformation and the Riga Summit held in May of 2006.  
During that hearing the International Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats echoes 
the 2006 NSS and QDR calls for NATO transformation.  They call the Riga Summit a pivotal moment 
for NATO identifying the ‘transformation summit as a “make or break” moment for NATO’64 
concerning U.S. foreign policy.  The U.S. was calling for NATO to “develop a truly expeditionary 
mindset with the requisite capabilities.”65  The hearing identified seven key objectives for the 
upcoming summit in Riga, all focused on developing expeditionary capabilities and expanding NATO 
influence beyond the European continent.  None of them focused on allied defense spending goals. 
The final administration document assessed of the Bush administration was the 2008 National Defense 
Strategy (NDS).  There is only one mention of NATO in its 23 pages.  In the section titled “Strengthen 
and Expand Alliances and Partnerships there are no specific references to any one alliance, coalition, 
or partnership, but a general statement which says, “We should not limit ourselves to the relationships 
of the past.”66  The Joint Chiefs voice a strong concern over the degradation of deterrent effect 
resultant of the change to world relations and technological advancement: 
“Deterrence is based upon credibility: In the contemporary strategic environment, 
the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries 
from taking a variety of actions against the U.S. and our allies and interests.  
These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, 
conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, 
electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare.  Economic interdependence and the 
growth of global communications further complicate the situation…For more 
than sixty years, the United States has secured the global commons for the 
benefit of all…We must work to develop new ways of operating across the full 
spectrum of warfare.  Our partnerships must be capable of applying military and 
non-military power when and where needed – a prerequisite against an adaptable 
transnational enemy.” 
US Joint Chiefs of Staff statement on deterrence, 2008 NDS67 
 
64 (The United States and NATO: Transformation and the Riga Summit;, 2006) 
65 (The United States and NATO: Transformation and the Riga Summit;, 2006, p. 13) 
66 (2008 National Defense Strategy, 2008, p. 15) 
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There were no directly overt calls from the Bush Administration to specifically increased defense 
spending on the part of Alliance members during his tenure.  The Alliance would have had to read 
between the lines of U.S. foreign policy outlined in the governing documents to see there was a 
turning of the tide away from the Clinton era vision of an America so invested in the success of its 
foreign policy initiatives that it would happily absorb all costs of implementation.  The United States 
was embarking on an initiative to invest in a transformation of their current international relationships 
and commitments, as well as the capabilities developed by their chosen partners.  The NATO decision 
to participate in the U.S. led war on terror in Afghanistan necessitated a change to NATO force 
posture to enable out of area operations and integration with U.S. forces.   
 
The economic interdependence created by the growing free-market economies, growth of global 
communications, and proliferation of weapons and technologies were changing the landscape of U.S. 
foreign policy.  The days of focusing U.S. security on a sole region or threat had come to an end.  I 
believe NATO recognized this change to U.S. policy, and it was the shift in U.S. prioritization which 
led NATO to make the changes to force posture.  It was the NATO desire to show solidarity with their 
chief benefactor which brought NATO to engage in actions in Afghanistan.  It was not direct calls 
made by the Bush administration to NATO specifically, but the overall shift in U.S. focus which 
provided the impetus for the changes to NATO which occurred during this period and set the stage for 
the Obama era’s global focus of effort.  President Obama’s foreign policy focus was cemented before 
he took office in 2009.  It is for these reasons I have assessed the influence of U.S. foreign policy 
during this era to be low to moderate.     
 
6.4 Obama Era (2009-2017) 
 
The Obama era’s first published National Security Strategy in 2010 did not leave much room for 
question regarding the United States position on future alliances and alliance relationships.  During the 
development of the 2010 NSS, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a statement to the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning US guidance to NATO’s New Strategic Concept.  
She stated, “The imbalance in military expenditure is one of the issues that some fear could undermine 
the future cohesion of the Alliance [and that] partners should play an increasing role in NATO 
activities”68 which at the time were primarily out of area.    
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The 2010 NSS became a defining document of change concerning U.S. foreign policy.  It signaled the 
full transition from the Clinton era of engaged leadership and willingness to shoulder the 
responsibilities and costs of Alliance defense.  President Obama’s first NSS made it clear that the 
United States now sought partnerships with globally minded and capable members who recognize an 
interdependent world of advanced threats which cannot be addressed through conventional means.  
Alliances with globally focused influence.  He makes it clear that the United States both cannot, and 
will not, be the sole guarantor of deterrence in any region of the world. 
 
“Americans have risen to meet – and to shape – moments of transition.  This is 
one of those moments.  The burdens of a young century cannot fall on American 
shoulders alone – indeed, our adversaries would like to see America sap our 
strength by overextending our power.  We are clear-eyed about the challenge of 
mobilizing collective action, and the shortfalls of our international system.” 
~President Barack Obama, Opening Statement of the 2010 NSS69 
 
This general perspective is echoed throughout the document.  In a section dedicated to peacekeeping 
and armed conflict resolution it is stated that the United States does not believe any one nation can or 
should be responsible to “shoulder the burden” of the world’s armed conflicts.70  The document 
repeatedly references initiatives to expand the United States’ alliances, coalitions, and partnerships to 
include globally minded and responsible partners.  The saturation of technology based global 
economic and communications interdependence necessitated a change from regionally focused efforts 
to globally based initiatives and partnerships.  The United States could not afford to sink costs into 
regionally focused alliances.  The United States saw itself as part of a “dynamic international 
environment” in which the threats to national security were under fire from new asymmetric 
capabilities and non-state actors who could influence world markets on a global scale.   
 
Advancing our interests will require expanding spheres of cooperation around the 
world…and may involve new arrangements to confront [current] threats. Our 
national security goals can only be reached if we make hard choices and work 
with international partners to share burdens.”  
 
69 (National Security Strategy, 2010, p. Preface) 




*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the 






~2010 National Security Strategy71  
 
The U.S. does make it clear that although foreign policy is changing from a regional to a global focus, 
requiring an expansion of diplomatic, military, and economic endeavors; they desire to maintain and 
even build upon their current alliances.  “We are committed to ensuring that NATO is able to address 
the full range of 21st century challenges, while serving as a foundation of European security…This 
requires investing now…building today the capacity to strengthen the foundations of our common 
security, and modernizing our capabilities in order to ensure we are agile in the face of change.  
International institutions – most prominently NATO and the United Nations – have been at the center 
of our international order since the mid-20th century; however, what is needed is a realignment of 
national actions and international institutions with shared interests.”72 A global focus. 
  
The UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy accurately assessed the 
change to U.S. policy identified in the rhetoric of the 2010 NSS when they concluded “geographical 
and functional shifts in U.S. policy… [raise] fundamental questions if our pre-eminent defense and 
security relationship is with an ally who has interests which are increasingly divergent from our 
own.”73   
 
Widening the gap, the collapse and subsequent 4-year recession of the European economy took its toll 
on European military investment between 2008 – 2012.  NATO members seemed all too accepting of 
a reliance on U.S. investment in the European continent until the Obama era rhetoric began to shed 
doubt on the future of U.S. participation as they announced the initiative to divest some of their focus 
from Europe, and reinvest in their strategic concerns on the Asian continent. 
 
In her 2011 article “America’s Pacific Century” Secretary Clinton addressed the lack of U.S. focus 
concerning the Pacific region while attempting to assure our European partners of our belief in the 
importance of maintaining our European ties. “By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is 
both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all that they 
deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is 
as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the 
Atlantic.”  The following removal of two of the four U.S. Army Brigades assigned to U.S. European 
 
71 (National Security Strategy, 2010, pp. 34, 36) 
72 (National Security Strategy, 2010, pp. 27, 40-42) 
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Command in 2012 did not bolster the opinion among NATO allies that the U.S. commitment to the 
European continent remained a priority focus of U.S. foreign policy.  What it did accomplish was 
gaining the attention of European member states within NATO as they assessed the impact this loss 
would have concerning immediate combat power in the region.  This potential impact was 
demonstrated through the United States calculated decision to participate in a limited capacity during 
the NATO led Libya campaign in 2011. 
 
The U.S. calculus to ‘take a back seat’ or ‘lead from behind’ once air superiority was assured over 
Libya paid off for U.S. policy.  After years of prodding NATO members to increase their investment 
in defense spending the U.S. had found an opportunity to drive the point home.  What would deter a 
threat to the European continent if the U.S. was decisively engaged on a non-European front?  After 
the conflict in Libya had concluded NATO was forced to make a re-assessment of readiness and 
investment in force structure. Libya had tested the alliance in the absence of direct U.S. military 
involvement and found their Article 3 deterrent capability was next to non-existent if confronted by a 
credible threat.  This was a calculated move by the United States which is highlighted in a statement 
from then National Security Advisor Tom Donilon in an article he wrote for the Washington Post on 
October 28, 2011.  He said the U.S. had used the Libya campaign to “revitalize” NATO.  The 
operation had “identified how the alliance could be more effective in the future.  The European allies 
faced several shortages in military assets and needed to make great investments, especially in 
precision guided munitions and unmanned systems that were critical on today’s battlefields.”74   
During his keynote address at the 2011 Munich Security Conference then Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen argued that without proper investment, we risk a Europe that is ‘divided, weaker and 
increasingly adrift from the United States,’ outlining a scenario in which European governments may 
be less capable of defending their populations against new threats.75  During this address the Secretary 
General also made a formal call to what he labeled ‘smart defense’ within NATO.  A structured 
investment strategy focused on the ability to “pool and share capabilities, to set the right priorities, and 
to better coordinate our efforts.”  He recognized the gap in interoperability required to counter the 
threats of the current day, and the fact that many member nations had stopped progressing their 
military capabilities with the end of the Cold War.  He followed these statements up by highlighting 
the fact that European defense spending had decreased by $45 billion over the previous two year span, 
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sighting only France, Britain, and Greece as European members spending the agreed 2 percent GDP 
on defense.76  This warning came only 1 month prior to the start of military actions in Libya. 
 
Petersson has dubbed the 2011 Libya conflict to be a “watershed” moment for NATO.  He believes the 
U.S. used that conflict as an opportunity to address the imbalance of responsibility among NATO 
members.  He cites Ellen Hallams, a lecturer at Kings College, saying “Washington is signaling more 
forcefully than ever to its European allies as well as NATO partners, that they must take on a greater 
share of Alliance burdens…and move away from a deeply entrenched culture of dependency.”77   
 
The Libya campaign demonstrated an erosion of military credibility within European NATO 
members.  After the initial establishment of air superiority by the United States, NATO was largely 
left to conduct the mission with significantly reduced support from the U.S. military.  The limited 
scale and scope of direct military support from the U.S. during the Libya conflict highlighted the 
inability of European NATO members to conduct comprehensive military operations on their own.  I 
do not bring the Libya campaign up to debate how it was managed, but to echo the statements made by 
Petersson and Hallams that it served as a calling card from the U.S. to NATO members.  If the U.S. 
chose to limit participation (or potentially not to participate at all)  in an Alliance action, NATO was 
not prepared to counter a serious threat.  An increase in military capability was necessary for the 
broader NATO membership.  The single point of failure was demonstrated during the Libya campaign, 
and an adjustment needed to be made to Alliance defense capability investments.  This became a 
pivotal moment in NATO and became a point of focus during the 2014 Wales Summit.     
 
The Libya campaign also demonstrated to potential rising powers just how reliant the European 
continent was on direct U.S. involvement.  The United States took the Libya conflict as an opportunity 
to provide a wake-up call to their European partners.  Diplomatic overtures and published policy 
decisions were not making the message clear to U.S. allies.  However, the resultant implication to 
European security highlighted by the Libya conflict was noted.  A New York Times editorial 
summarized the impact well when it stated, ‘European NATO’s inability to master a minor challenge 
like Libya should frighten every defense ministry in Europe.’78  The implication could no longer be 
ignored.  Without direct U.S. military support there existed an erosion in the European Article 3 
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deterrent effect.79  US Ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volker, and Vice Admiral (Ret) Kevin Green 
addressed the Atlantic Council concerning NATO Reform in December of 2011.  They addressed four 
key issues concerning the topic.  Number 3 was defense spending disparity among members.  They 
directly identified the decline in defense spending by European NATO members as a causal factor in 
the erosion of both NATO deterrence and ability to effectively employ forces.   
“During the 1980s, Allies were urged to maintain defense spending at 3 percent 
of GDP. As many nations failed to do so, this target was reduced to 2 percent in 
the 2000s. Even that target is being missed, and indeed European NATO member 
defense spending as a share of GDP now averages less than 1.7 percent.  The US 
defense budget once accounted for roughly half of the defense budget of all 
NATO members, now it is roughly 75 percent…There is no credibility to the 
notion of Alliance action if most Allies actually lack meaningful capabilities to 
contribute to NATO missions.” 
~ ASOC Issue Brief, Dec 201180 
 
Counter to some of the previously veiled statements concerning burden sharing made by government 
officials, 2011 proved to be a turning point in U.S. rhetoric on the subject.  U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates took a very direct approach when addressing the issue at his last address to Brussels in 
June 2011.  Secretary Gates directly addressed the division between those member states capable (or 
willing) to participate in kinetic actions and those who are not when he said, “In the past, I’ve worried 
openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance.  Between members who specialize in “soft” 
humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat 
missions.  Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance 
commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees 
or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.  This is no longer a 
hypothetical worry.  We are there today.  And it is unacceptable.”81 
 
The U.S. pivot to the Pacific combined with the example set by the Libya campaign may have 
bolstered the Russian perspective concerning viability of a ‘land grab’ in 2014 when they invaded the 
Crimean Peninsula.  The premonition made by Cimbala and Forster that ‘A fractured NATO, and 
 
79 See “Leaderless in Europe,” Editorial, New York Times, 29 June 2011. And “Libya’s Dark Lesson for 
NATO,” New York Times, 4 September 2011. 
80 (Volker & Vice Admiral Green, 2011, p. 2) Ambassador Kurt Volker served as the US ambassador to NATO 
and is a Senior Advisor and member of the Strategic Advisors Group at the Atlantic Council. He is also the 
Managing Director, International, BGR Group.  Vice Admiral Kevin P. Green, USN (Ret.) is the Vice President 
for Defense and Intelligence for IBM Federal. 
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especially a large divide in purposes or commitments as between the United States and its European 
security partners, invites aggression and the possibility of inadvertent escalation’82 was realized in this 
action. 
The United States wanted NATO to recognize that a military-based alliance is made with members 
who provide complementary capabilities which increases the overall effectiveness of the Alliance.  
The free-riding checkbook diplomacy seen from the Germans in the 1991 Gulf War (Ringsmose, 
2010), and the unwillingness to share directly in risk witnessed through Allied national caveats to use 
of forces in Afghanistan severely restricting Allied commanders called out by Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates (Gates, 2011b) did not support the idea of a balanced military alliance.  As stated shortly 
after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 by U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, “Threats 
to the Alliance neither start nor stop at Europe’s doorstep.  Emerging threats and technologies mean 
that fewer places are truly ‘out of area’.”83  The U.S. was pressuring European NATO to increase its 
contributions.  
 
Kunertova recognized the significance of Russia’s strategic move in Crimea as a seminal moment of 
influence to NATO members concerning defense spending when she noted, “Since Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, NATO has put collective defense back on top of its agenda.”84 
Leading up to the 2014 Wales Summit the burden sharing debate had become a point of political 
contention not only among members of the alliance, but within U.S. politics.  NATO member defense 
spending took a front seat at the 2013 Senate Confirmation hearings for John Kerry to become 
Secretary of State when he was asked if he was prepared to “press all members of NATO to increase 
their defense expenditures.”  Senator Kerry replied that he would “continue to urge allied 
commitments to sustain and build critical capabilities, as part of an effort to invest in a NATO force 
for 2020 that is fully trained and equipped to respond to any threat and defend our common interests.  
Adequate levels of spending are crucial to that goal…”85  The fact that this question was center stage 
during the Secretary of State confirmation hearing leading up to the 2014 Wales summit demonstrates 
the severity of concern surrounding this issue at the time. 
While the initial commitment to a defense investment of 2% GDP was initially verbally agreed upon 
in 2006 by NATO Defense Ministers, it was intended at the time to be an indicator of a country’s 
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political will to contribute to the Alliance’s common defense efforts.86  The summits of 2012 – 2018 
proved pivotal to the determination of what NATO members would agree defines the debate, as well 
as a plan of action to rectify the imbalance. 
At the final meeting of foreign ministers prior to the 2014 heads of state Summit in Wales, Secretary 
of State Kerry addressed the defense spending issue when he said: 
“As we head to the Wales summit, every ally spending less than 2 percent of 
their GDP needs to dig deeper and make a concrete commitment to do more. And 
all you have to do is look at a map in order to understand why – Ukraine, Iraq, 
Syria – all threats to peace and to security, and they surround the region.”87 
 
In recognition of the challenges posed by Russia, the Middle East, and North Africa the members of 
the Wales Summit approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan.  This action plan loosely defines a 
strategic initiative to ensure the Alliance is “ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security 
challenges [and] changes in the security environment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of 
concern to Allies.”88  The problem with this action plan is that even though it did establish tangible 
outcomes such as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF),  it did not quantifiably define 
objectives within a timeline or division of committed assets among members.  An issue which will be 
dealt with at the 2018 summit in Brussels.    
 
Perhaps the most significant event of the 2014 summit occurred when the NATO members defined 
their own measurable metric of collective burden.  At the Wales Summit it was determined that 
collective burden would be measured in the form of the individual member’s defense spending goal 
which had been verbally, but not formally agreed upon in 2006.  A target defense investment of 2% 
gross domestic product (GDP) by 2024 was defined as the goal which all members would strive to 
meet.  The impetus being to ensure a credible Article 3 and Article 5 capability for NATO.89  
According to the NATO website NATO leaders agreed to reverse the trend of declining defense 
budgets and decided: 
 
• Allies currently meeting the 2% guideline on defense spending will aim to continue to do so; 
 
86 ("Funding NATO," 2019) 
87 (Kerry, 2014b) 
88 ("Wales Summit Declaration," 2014) 
89 Article 3:  In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, 
by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and 
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• Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defense is below this level will:  halt any 
decline, aim to increase defense expenditure in real terms as DP grows; and aim to move 
towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability 
Targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls. 
• Within a decade Allies who are spending less than 20% of their annual defense spending on 
major equipment will aim to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total 
defense expenditures.   
~Heads of State and Government Press Release following 2014 Wales Summit90 
 
“Our overall security and defense depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Increased 
investments should be directed towards meeting our capability priorities, and Allies also need to display 
the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed…All Allies 
will: ensure that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and 
sustainability and other agreed output metrics; ensure that their armed forces can operate together 
effectively, including through the implementation of agreed NATO standards and doctrines. Allies will 
review national progress annually. This will be discussed at future Defense Ministerial meetings and 
reviewed by Heads of State and Government at future Summits” (Heads of State and Government, 
2014).91    
Both the NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen and the United States recognized the Ukraine crisis 
as a “wake up call” for the transatlantic community (Petersson, 2015, p. 115).  The result of the 2014 
Wales summit commitment for each member of the alliance to meet defined defense spending 
requirements can, I believe, be attributed to a few seminal events.  First, the shift in U.S. foreign policy 
from regional to global focus and its resultant change in U.S. willingness to continue to be the sole 
guarantor of credible deterrence.  Second was the Sept 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States and 
the subsequent change to force structure required to support the War on Terror.  Next, the U.S. calculated 
role in the Libya campaign highlighted  NATO shortcomings and the U.S. desire for NATO to take 
greater responsibility.  Lastly, the presence of a renewed potential Russian threat which resonated with 
a generation of NATO members who still have vivid memories of growing up in the Cold War era.   
Even though the United States was pleased with the outcome of the Wales Summit, the Obama 
administration kept up the pressure.  Vice President Biden highlighted NATO defense spending again 
in October 2014 when he addressed the Harvard Kennedy School saying that “the transatlantic 
 
90 (Heads of State and Government, 2014, Wales Summit Declaration [Press release], Para 14-15) 
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relationship does not sustain itself by itself…it could not be sustained by the U.S. alone.  It requires 
investment and sacrifice on both sides of the Atlantic.”92  Secretary of State Kerry followed up this 
message with an address in Brussels that December saying: “Every ally has to pull their weight…we 
can’t have 21st century security on the cheap.  All nations, all members of the alliance, need to be 
increasing their capacity to be able to meet the challenges that we face today” (Kerry, 2014a). 
The Obama administration clearly lobbied hard for NATO members to increase and update their military 
capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century.  The 2010 NSS was riddled with calls to even out 
the costs of maintaining credible deterrence and defense within the alliance, and to reduce the NATO 
reliance on the United States as a primary (if not sole) guarantor of security for the European continent.  
In stark contrast, the 2015 NSS which followed the Wales summit is almost devoid of any calls for equal 
burden sharing.  Where the previous NSS had a large focus on re-balancing of alliance burdens, this one 
makes almost no mention of it.   
“NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an 
expanding global security network.  Our Article 5 commitment to the collective 
defense of all NATO Members is ironclad, as is our commitment to ensuring the 
Alliance remains ready and capable for crisis response and cooperative security.” 
~2015 US National Security Strategy93  
Following the Wales Summit, the Obama Administration rhetoric calmed down concerning member 
obligations and commitments to the Alliance.  It was not until President Trump assumed office that 
defense spending was again brought to the fore of American-NATO interactions.  The 2016 Warsaw 
Summit recognized the Allies’ commitment and progress toward their 2014 agreement:   
“Since Wales, we have turned a corner. Collectively, Allies' defense expenditures 
have increased in 2016 for the first time since 2009. In just two years, a majority 
of Allies have halted or reversed declines in defense spending in real terms. 
Today, five Allies meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their 
Gross Domestic Product on defense. Ten Allies meet the NATO guideline to 
spend more than 20% of their defense budgets on major equipment, including 
related Research & Development…There is still much work to be done. Efforts 
to achieve a more balanced sharing of the costs and responsibilities continue. 
Defense Ministers will continue to review progress annually”  
 
92 (Petersson, 2015, p. 167) 
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~Heads of State and Government, 201694   
This is not to say the issue was solved by the Wales Summit agreement.  The years following the 2014 
agreement did see an average increase in defense spending among NATO member states which is 
attributed to the Wales agreement.  Analysis of the individual changes to member investment 
highlighted an apparent gulf between the countries of Eastern Europe (fig. 1), all of which suffered at 
the hands of Soviet/Russian aggression for decades, and the states of Western Europe (fig. 2), which 
have lived under American military protection for well over half a century (Richter, 2016).  In an 
interview published in The Atlantic in April 2016, President Obama again put allies on notice when he 
said that “free riders aggravate me,” and further noted that their actions frequently do not match 
rhetoric (Goldberg, 2016).95 
 
Figure 1. Eastern European % GDP Investment in defense spending 2008-2018 (SPIRI, 2019) 
 
94 (Heads of State and Government, 2016, Warsaw Summit Communique 9 July 2016, Para 34. Retrieved from 
NATO.int: https://www.nato.int. Accessed 24 April 2020) 
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Figure 2. Western European % GDP Investment in defense spending 2008-2018 (SPIRI, 2019) 
 
I have characterized the Obama era influence on defense spending as having a high impact.  The 
Obama administration’s measured calls to a formal agreement of a bottom-line concerning defense 
spending, and his consistent messaging concerning the imbalance of capability within the Alliance 
were and global demands on U.S. military assets were instrumental to the 2014 Wales agreement.  
Obama’s calculated use of U.S. military power during the Libya campaign served to underscore his 
rhetoric and resolve as well as demonstrate the need for European NATO to invest in themselves.    
6.5 Trump Era (2017-Present) 
 
Even before being elected, President Trump was beating the drum of imbalanced burden concerning 
NATO.  It was noted that while the message was not new, one way Mr. Trump is different [from 
previous administrations] is that he has made this a far more consistent and far more intense theme of 
nearly every discussion he has about NATO (Baker, 2017).  At a rally in 2016 presidential hopeful 
Trump made a statement that the United States may base their future decisions to defend members of 
the alliance on their decision to foot their fair share of the bill (referencing the 2% defense spending).96   
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In his opening statement for the 2017 National Security Strategy, President Trump announced his 
America First foreign policy initiative.  He pledged that the Trump Administration would “revitalize 
the American economy, rebuild our military, defend our borders, protect our sovereignty, and advance 
our values” (Trump, 2017)97  He also noted that America’s allies were now contributing more to the 
common defense, strengthening even our strongest alliances.98  The document does, however, continue 
to apply pressure for NATO members to meet the obligation of the Wales Summit agreements. 
“The U.S. expects members to assume greater responsibility for and to pay their 
fair share to protect our mutual interests, sovereignty, and values…The United 
States fulfills our defense responsibilities and expects others to do the same.” 
~2017 National Security Strategy99 
Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, addressed the America First policy in a panel discussion with 
Stephen Hadley at the United States Institute for Peace on 30 Oct 2018.  Secretary Mattis stated in this 
discussion that he believed U.S. foreign policy had become militarized during the Obama 
Administration.  This rings true with Petersson’s assessment that the United States saw NATO as a 
military and political tool during the Obama era (Petersson, 2015, p. 42) versus the cultural tool 
leveraged by President Clinton.  Mattis believed the new America First policy was about ensuring the 
military means resumed its correct place as an enabling element of national power with the State 
Department in the lead.  “when we talk about America First, it’s not America alone… In history, 
nations with allies thrive, nations without them die.”100   
In addition to an America First foreign policy, the 2017 NSS beats the drum of interoperability and 
integrated effort among allied nations.101  This echoed the last Quadrennial Defense Review which 
identified interoperability 11 times as a primary goal of military alliance measures for the United 
States.102 
In his first trip to Brussels as the Secretary of Defense Mattis did continue to apply the necessary 
pressure on members to meet their defense spending obligations: 
“There is no way I can go back to America and ask American parents to care 
more about the freedoms that European children enjoy than European parents do, 
[Europeans] will have to pay a modicum for the best defense in the world.  And 
 
97 ("President Trump Announces a National Security Strategy to Advance America’s Interests," 2017) 
98 (National Security Strategy, 2017, p. Preface) 
99 (National Security Strategy, 2017, p. 48) 
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what is that modicum?  Two percent.  I recognize that only leaves 98 percent for 
everything else.  But I think we can afford two percent for what grew out of the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment to survive in this world.  I think we have to 
recognize that, after 2014 especially, that things began changing.  That it was no 
longer the same Europe that it was before Putin began his adventures.” 
~Sec of Defense James Mattis, 2018103 
His final statements on the topic of Allied defense spending during this discussion was to ensure 
everyone understood this was not a new message.  He referenced every Secretary of Defense since 
Secretary Perry in 1997 as making this call to increased defense spending from European members.  
He identifies the difference now, as the “extremely strong statement of the President that it had gone 
on long enough.”104  The initial few years of the Trump Administration concerned NATO members of 
the U.S. commitment to the Alliance.  Even with the increased defense spending, there were still only 
a handful of members who had increased spending above 2% by 2018.   
In his first visit to NATO headquarters on 26 June 2019, acting U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper 
attempted to re-invigorate NATO members concerning the U.S. commitment to NATO when he told 
the assembly of defense chiefs, “It is not a change in mission [the pivot to the pacific], it is not a 
change in priorities, and it is not a change in the United States commitment to the NATO alliance.”105   
The 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration headlined its press release by announcing their commitment to 
all aspects of the Defense Investment Pledge agreed to at the 2014 Wales Summit stating “two-thirds 
of Allies have national plans in place to spend 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defense by 
2024.”  The press release went on to say, “Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance’s cohesion, 
solidarity, credibility, and ability to fulfil our Article 3 and Article 5 commitments.106   
Perhaps the most significant agreement made during the 2018 summit is the new NATO Readiness 
Initiative.  In addition to their investment pledge NATO members have agreed to focus defense 
spending efforts on increasing readiness and responsiveness.  The initiative seeks to ensure a credible 
interoperable force relevant to the challenges of high-intensity warfighting which is capable of rapid 
deployment at 30 days’ readiness or less.107  This updated initiative would not be possible under the 
undefined collective defense spending initiatives prior to 2014.  This initiative provided guidance to 
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procure a collectively focused defense spending investment with a goal of yielding a truly capable and 
interoperable force.  Not just a list of capabilities that would fall flat if one nation decides not to 
participate in a NATO action.  In contrast to the 2014 Readiness Action Plan, this new initiative 
outlines specific assets and numbers in a clearly defined and time-bound goal.  It is focused on 
improving readiness of specified current NATO partner assets, not acquisition of new ones.  From the 
overall pool of forces, Allies will offer an additional 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium 
manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces.108  This initiative is 
significant as it is the first defined example of a collectively shared investment burden spread across 
the whole of NATO membership which is tied directly to an Article 3 credible military deterrence.   
The Brussels Summit also saw the alliance commit to non-combat out of area investments with a new 
NATO training mission in Iraq in coordination with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, and an 
agreement to extend funding for the Afghan Security Forces through 2024.  Interestingly, both of these 
out of area initiatives are led by the United States’ initiative to globalize the focus of their alliances.    
The pressure the United States has exerted on NATO members since the mid 2000’s has yielded 
results.  Even though only nine members have met the 2% target as of 2019, NATO members have 
increased defense spending for 5 years in a row.  NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg addressed 
the U.S. Congress on 3 April 2019.  During his address he said, “NATO Allies must spend more on 
defense.  This has been the clear message from President Trump.  And this message is having a real 
impact.  After years of reducing defense budgets.  All Allies have stopped the cuts.  And all Allies 
have increased their defense spending.  Before they were cutting billions.  Now they are adding 
billions.”109  Secretary General Stoltenberg again addressed the issue in late November 2019 when he 
said that defense spending across European allies and Canada increased in real terms by 4.6% in 2019. 
"This is unprecedented progress and it is making NATO stronger," Stoltenberg said.110   
 
It is difficult to characterize the Trump administration influence on defense spending.  He is holding 
the line concerning the demand for Alliance members to increase spending and ‘put their money 
where their mouth is.’  I believe most NATO members are holding the line to see what comes of the 
next U.S. election in 2020.  The Trump administration has NATO members questioning the U.S. 
commitment to NATO.  Trump has potential to have a high impact, but only if he is re-elected and has 
the opportunity to follow-through on his ultimatums. 
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7 Defense Spending 
 
Sixty-five years of history has revealed that most European countries (and Canada) are simply not 
prepared to spend what is required to field and maintain highly advanced defense forces.  In effect, up 
until the last decade, European governments have never believed that Washington will diminish its 
commitment to the Western alliance, no matter how little they contribute nor how shamelessly they 
free-ride on the United States (Richter, 2016).  We have noted a moderate change in that trend since 
the 2014 Wales Summit, but the current Trump Administration is not backing down the pressure to 
meet, or potentially increase the target of 2% by all members within the NATO alliance (Haltiwanger, 
2019).  To date the 2% goal has proved to be elusive to all but 3 of 29 NATO members since the 2014 
agreement; however, according to NATO.org all but 2 alliance members are on track to meet the 
intended target by 2024.111   
 
7.1 Defense spending during the Cold War (1947-1991) 
 
The raison d’etre of the Cold War era fostered uncompromising investment in defense and deterrent 
capability by NATO members.  All members with the exception of Italy and Canada were spending 
over 2% GDP on defense during this period.  The NATO average defense expenditure as measured by 
percent GDP investment was above 4% from 1960-1963, after which it remained above 3% until 1987 
where it took its first dip below the 3% mark in the history of NATO.112  From the time the Soviet 
Union was seen to be in decline there was a negative trend in defense investment among NATO allies 
until the 2014 Wales Summit.   
 
With the great threat from the east all but decimated, the need to maintain the military structure and 
resultant expense was deemed unnecessary to maintain the peace desired among NATO members.  It 
was during the period following the Gulf War that the alliance adopted a collective concept for the 
first time in 1991 known as the Alliance Strategic Concept.  Where the doctrines of the Cold War 
years were almost solely dependent on U.S. controlled deterrent munitions, the new Alliance Strategic 
Concept was intended to spread both the burden and the responsibility for defense of Europe more 
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evenly among the members of NATO.  While the intention was good, the result was still heavily 
dependent on U.S. assets and involvement.   
 
7.2 Defense spending after the Cold War (1990-2014) 
 
It could be argued that the Clinton era messaging of foreign policy enabled European NATO members 
to continue their reliance on American assets and investment to maintain the Alliance’s credible 
deterrence posture.   Without an imminent threat at the doorstep, and with an American ‘benefactor’ 
willing to accept all costs of maintaining the Alliance, post-Cold War investment in defense spending 
deteriorated significantly within the Alliance.  The overall NATO average first dropped below the 2% 
GDP line in 2000. The 1991-2018 overall NATO average was 1.91% GDP if you include the United 
States to bolster the numbers.  By comparison, the overall NATO average during the last 30 years of 
the Cold War was 3.42% GDP.   
 
The U.S. was no exception to this post-Cold War downturn in defense spending.  U.S. investment in 
defense spending reached its lowest point in 1999 when it dipped to 2.90% GDP where it leveled out 
until 2001 and the start of the War on Terror.  From there the U.S. investment trended positive to its 
most recent peak of 4.65% GDP in 2010 at the beginning of the Obama era.  During this same time of 
U.S. investment growth, the NATO average continued on a negative trend until reaching its trough of 
1.43% GDP in 2014.113  The G.W. Bush era witnessed the beginning of a change to how the U.S. 
viewed NATO.  While G.W. Bush still saw NATO as more of a cultural tool to aid the spread of 
democratic ideals, his administration started the push to shape NATO as a credible member of the War 
on Terror.  The out of area operations associated with a new asymmetric warfare concept required a 
change to NATO force structure and Alliance commitments.  The G.W. Bush era ushered in the 
beginning of the rhetoric demanding European NATO members begin increasing their investment in 
defense spending across the board.  It is important to note the European economic collapse of 2008-
2012 plays a significant role in NATO member defense investment during this period as well as mass 
immigration of displaced persons resultant of actions in the Middle East causing Eastern European 
economic instability.   
 
This was a period characterized by NATO expansion with the addition of 13 eastern block and Baltic 
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defense associated with the new geographic spread of its members.  The challenge to geographically 
spread allies results in differences of perceived or assessed threat.  More members complicate debate 
concerning opinions on use of political instruments or management and investment in collective 
resources.  However, it was not the addition of new members that brought down the average NATO 
investment.  Of the original members, only the U.S. and France maintained an average above 2.0% 
during this period of time from the end of the Cold War to present day, with the United Kingdom and 
Portugal remaining close to the 2.0% threshold.   
 
There were four major events during this period which lay the foundation for a change to NATO 
formally adopting a metric focused on defense spending investment.  The first was the U.S. foreign 
policy shift to global interdependence and the resultant change to U.S. views of alliance contributions.  
Second was the Sept 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the subsequent change to force 
structure required to support the War on Terror.  Third was the level of U.S. involvement in the 2011 
Libya campaign, and fourth was the 2014 Wales Summit commitment to 2%.   
 
7.3 Defense spending after Wales (2014 – 2019) 
 
The progress made on allied burden sharing among Europe and Canada was noted by Secretary 
General Stoltenberg during a meeting of defense chiefs at NATO headquarters in June 2019 during his 
opening remarks for the meeting.  “There is a real increase of 3.9% in defense spending across Europe 
and Canada.  This comes on top of the increase we have seen over the last years, meaning now that we 
have five consecutive years of increase in defense spending and the European allies and Canada will 
have added much more than $100 billion since 2016.”114 
In 2014, three Allies (The United Kingdom, Greece, and the United States) spent 2% GDP or more on 
defense.115 The number had increased to nine by 2019.  According to the NATO.org website, all but 
two Allies have submitted plans to NATO showing they have created national budget plans to meet 
the 2% defense spending objective by 2024.116  
 
114 (Garamone, 2019) 
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8 Member contributions to defense 
spending  
 
Between the end of the cold war and the 2014 summit in Wales the trend in defense spending as 
percent GDP was in steady decline (fig. 3) crossing the 2% threshold in 2000.  While not all NATO 
members have responded favorably to the 2% goal agreed upon that year, the non-US NATO average 
trend has since seen a steady increase towards the intended target.   
 
 
Figure 3. Non-US NATO Average % GDP investment in defense spending 1990-2014 (SPIRI, 2019) 
 
Since 2014 the average annual increase of NATO defense spending as measured by percent GDP 
investment has been 0.04% per year (fig. 4); rising from 1.435% in 2014 to reach a 2018 mark of 
1.598%. This puts the NATO average on track to meet the target goal by 2028.117   
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Figure 4. Non-US NATO Average % GDP investment in defense spending 2012 -2018 (SPIRI, 2019) 
 
There have been a number of contributing factors to defense spending in European nations since the 
end of the cold war in 1991.  One of the more notable factors being Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, 
which started in 2008 with the collapse of Iceland’s banking system and was followed later that year 
by the global impact of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis.118  The impacts triggered a cascading 
effect resulting in a European recession lasting until 2012.  The impact was significant and felt deeply 
throughout Europe.  Many NATO nations chose to sacrifice defense spending in order to balance their 
books resulting in an unwillingness to live up to [NATO’s] ambition to play a global role in foreign 
and defense matters (Erlanger, 2011).  In a  press conference held prior to the 2014 NATO summit in 
Wales Lord Dannatt, a former head of the British Army stated: “The sad fact is that with the exception 
of a small number of European NATO member states –which include the UK and France principally – 
the vast majority of the armed forces of other European states lack real usable capability and their 
governments often lack the political will to fund their armed forces properly.”119   
 
When comparing the United States against other NATO members since the end of the Cold War it is 
clear there has been a disproportionate investment, and without the U.S. contribution NATO falls 
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woefully short of the 2% average ambition agreed upon in 2014 (fig 5).  It is telling that the average 
non-U.S. NATO member investment has trended negatively even after the article 5 declaration in 
2001.  It took a combination of foreign policy change backed with demonstrated resolve to bring 
NATO members to the United States vision of what is a fair and equitable balance of burden in 2014.   
 
 
Figure 5. Defense Expenditure With and Without U.S. 1989 – 2019 (Reid, 2019)120 
 
Even though today the combined wealth of the non-U.S. Allies, measured in GDP, exceeds that of the 
United States, the non-U.S. Allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on 
defense.121  It should be noted here that the goal of the United States is not to close the gap in defense 
spending between itself and other Alliance members, but to set a bottom line investment requirement 
which the United States believes will enable maturation of Article 3 capabilities within the Alliance to 
meet future requirements, and reduce Alliance dependence on U.S. assets to achieve those ends.  The 
difference in defense spending between what are primarily locally focused members of the Euro-
Atlantic Alliance, and the globally focused U.S. Superpower will never be “equal.”   
 
 
120 Chart taken from a CNBC report depicting NATO defense expenditure as share of % GDP.  The report 
conducted an assessment of U.S. influence to the inflation of NATO reported numbers.  When the U.S. 
contribution is removed from the data the NATO average investement after the Cold War has not been above the 
2% guideline since before 2000.  
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It is important to recognize that U.S. investment in defense spending is not only targeted to support 
strategic objectives within North America and Europe but covers commitments outside the Euro-
Atlantic area.  Today, the volume of the U.S. defense expenditure represents more than two thirds  of 
the defense spending of the Alliance as a whole.  Today France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
together represent more than 50 per cent of the non-U.S. Allied defense spending, which creates 




This investigation suggests changes to United States foreign policy, administration rhetoric, and 
calculated commitment of military forces as a demonstration of administration resolve have had a 
moderate impact on NATO member defense spending.  The United States has leveraged their position 
as the primary benefactor of credible deterrence within the Alliance to advance U.S. led initiatives 
designed to meet the strategic security goals of the United States.  Since the end of the Cold War the 
progression of defense spending by European NATO closely follows the foreign policy initiatives of 
the United States concerning the European continent as outlined in U.S. National Security Strategy 
documents.  This is in keeping with expectations associated with a response from a rational actor 
(NATO) when dealing with a partner (United States) who holds significant bargaining power as the 
chief arbiter of security and deterrence for the region (Ringsmose).   
 
The dramatic turnaround in average NATO defense spending since the 2014 Wales Summit (fig. 4) 
demonstrates the significance of that particular event.  Previous verbal agreements to increase defense 
spending had not yielded a change in European NATO defense investment.  The administration 
rhetoric and actions of the 2010-2014 period proved critical to formally adopting the agreement to 
meet a 2% GDP defense spending goal.   
 
I believe further assessment will be required in the near future concerning management of defense 
investment as it relates to NATO requirements.  As stated earlier, I believe the United States will 
attempt to influence how investment funds are used through demands on other agreements to shape the 
output variables resultant of those investments to meet U.S. desires.  In addition, the narrow focus of 
this investigation does not allow for assessment of other factors  which may impact Alliance member 
decisions such as geographic location, domestic policies, or impacts of changes in the global economy.  
My investigation has also identified a divide between Eastern (fig. 1) and Western (fig. 2) European 
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spending among NATO members has reversed course to finally trend positive, further investigation is 
warranted to determine the disparity between these geographic regions.        
 
The four key events driving a change to U.S. foreign policy and their impact on US-NATO relations 
follows a progression of action-reaction by rational actors.  The decline in defense investment after the 
Cold War was consistent with the low impact of the US foreign policy during the Clinton era which 
supported a NATO credibility based almost solely on United States leadership in all facets.  The 
change to a foreign policy centered around regionally focused alliances with globally focused 
influence took two administrations to achieve.   The Obama era demonstrated a period of high impact.  
The political rhetoric associated with the demand for a more engaged NATO member commitment to 
defense spending required the United States to demonstrate its resolve during the Libya campaign 
before NATO members took true notice.  This action set the stage for the 2014 Wales Summit. Add 
the specter of a potentially resurgent Russia, and new members with legitimate concern along their 
eastern flank who are eager to please the United States whom they still see as their primary pillar of 
credible protection.   
 
All of these actions have positively influenced NATO to formally adopt the 2% guideline championed 
by the United States.  According to NATO reporting, all but 2 members have submitted plans and are 
on target to meet the agreement by 2024.122  It is hard to deny that U.S. foreign policy has not 
significantly influenced NATO members to formally agree to increase defense spending in order to 
assuage the concerns of and the United States; currently NATO’s most credible ally in terms of 
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